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Abstract
This paper studies optimal security design in a dynamic setting with an agency prob-
lem that arises when an agent in charge of a project can divert cash flows for his own
consumption at the expense of an outside investor. Cash flows are unobservable and
unverifiable by the outside investor, who relies on the agent’s reports, and has the right
to liquidate the project. Unlike previous analyses, we allow cash flows to be correlated
over time. We solve for the optimal contract and show that it can be implemented us-
ing a credit line with an interest rate that increases with the balance on the credit line.
This finding is consistent with the fact that the majority of commercial loans are lines
of credit with performance pricing. Thus, our model provides theoretical evidence that
performance pricing is used to mitigate the agency cost. In addition, we develop a new
recursive method to deal with a correlated privately observed variable in dynamic agency
settings. It allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the problem and obtain a closed-form
solution for the optimal contract.
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1 Introduction
More than 87% of all commercial and industrial loans made by large domestic banks are
loans under commitment1, otherwise known as lines of credit. A line of credit is a contract
between a firm and a bank that lets the firm borrow from the bank during the life of the
contract on terms specified in advance. Two main characteristics of a credit line are the credit
limit, which stipulates the maximum amount of credit allowed, and the interest rate charged
on the balance. Very often, instead of a fixed rate of interest, performance pricing schemes
are used that connect the interest rate to some measure of the borrower’s performance, such
as the borrower’s interest coverage ratio, debt-to-EBITDA ratio, leverage ratio, or current
credit rating. Asquith, Beatty and Weber (2004) report that more than 50% of lending
agreements2 have performance pricing features. Moreover, most of the lending agreements
require the borrower to pay a higher interest rate when the borrower performs poorly.
Manso, Strulovici and Tchistyi (2004) study diﬀerent forms of performance pricing in a
dynamic capital-structure model, in which default is endogenously triggered by equity holders
when the firm’s assets fall to a certain level. In a setting with a bankruptcy cost and tax
benefits but without an agency problem, they prove that debt obligations that result in paying
higher interest rates in times of poor performance and lower interest rates in times of high
performance are not the most eﬃcient way to raise money. Such debt obligations precipitate
default and increase bankruptcy cost, since they impose a higher debt burden when the firm
experiences financial strains. A loan with a fixed interest rate results in a higher value of the
firm. This finding raises a question: why are such performance pricing schemes so widely
used in practice?
The goal of this paper is to explain the existence of the very popular form of bank lending:
a line of credit with an escalating interest rate. We develop a model of security design in
which a line of credit with an escalating interest rate is a part of the optimal contract.
In the friction-free world of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the market value of the firm is
independent of its capital structure. As Manso, Strulovici and Tchistyi (2004) establish, the
theory of trade-oﬀ between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs does not justify performance
pricing. This paper introduces an agency problem into the model and shows that performance
pricing is used to mitigate the agency cost.
Specifically, a risk-neutral agent with limited liability needs external financing for a prof-
itable business project. If funded, the project generates stochastic cash flows. An outside
investor is unable to observe the cash flows, while the agent has an ability to divert the cash
flows for his own consumption at the expense of the investor. Before initiating the project,
the agent and the investor (or a group of investors) sign a contract that will govern their
1E.2 Survey of Terms of Business Lending, August 2-6, 2004 (Federal Reserve Statistical Release)
2Asquith, Beatty and Weber (2004) use the data on loan contracts in the Loan Pricing Corporation data-
base.
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relationship after the project is initiated. In particular, the contract obligates the agent to
report the cash flows to the investor, although the investor cannot verify the agent’s reports.
In addition, the contract specifies payments between the agent and the investor conditional
on the history of the agent’s reports, and the circumstances under which the control of the
project’s assets is transferred from the agent to the investor. In this latter case, the agent
is fired and the investor makes optimal use of the assets. The transfer of control leads to
ineﬃciencies, either due to a dead-weight cost associated with it, or because the investor is
less capable than the agent of running the project and cannot find an equivalent replacement
for the agent’s managerial talent.
We assume that the cash flows are correlated over time and follow a two-state Markov
process. The correlation is an important assumption, not only because it is a more realistic
assumption than independent cash flows, but also because it creates an additional degree of
informational asymmetry between the agent and the investor. With correlated cash flows,
the agent has a superior knowledge, not only about the current cash flow realization that he
observes directly, but also about the future cash flows, since their distribution is determined
by the current cash flow realization.
We characterize the optimal contract in this setting and its implementation using stan-
dard securities. We find that the optimal contract can be implemented using a combination
of equity, a coupon bond and a credit line with an interest rate that increases with the out-
standing balance on the credit line. According to this implementation, the agent owns a
fraction of the firm’s equity, while being obligated to make coupon payments on the bond
and interest payments on the credit line balance to the investor, who also owns the rest of
the firm’s equity. The initial draw on the credit line is determined by the amount of funds
provided by the investor, as well as the bargaining power of the parties. The agent uses the
cash flows generated by the project to make the current debt payments and to repay the
balance on the credit line. When the cash flow is low, the agent is allowed to draw on the
credit line to make the current debt payments, as long as he does not exceed the credit limit.
The agent is in default if he is unable to fulfill his current debt obligations without exceeding
the credit line limit. In this case, the investor takes control over the firm’s assets and fires
the agent.
In this combination of securities, the roles of the coupon bond and equity are straightfor-
ward. The coupon bond is used to extract verifiable cash flows, while dividends paid to the
equity holders oﬀer a reward to the agent for repaying the debt. The role of the credit line
with an escalating interest rate is more sophisticated. The balance on the credit line can be
considered as a memory device that summarizes all the relevant information regarding the
agent’s performance. The interest rate, along with the credit limit, determines the dynamics
of the credit line balance and the timing of the default. When the agent reports a low cash
flow and fails to make the interest payment, the balance on the credit line increases by the
3
amount of the unmade interest payment. When the balance goes over the credit limit default
occurs. The speed at which the balance grows is determined by the interest rate; and this
speed is greater when the balance is higher. The agent has the incentive to use high cash
flows to reduce the balance as well as the interest rate. The threat of losing control over the
project induces the agent to pay the debt.
To see why the interest rate on the credit line should increase with the balance, consider
what will happen when the agent keeps stealing the cash flows until the credit line is exhausted
and default occurs. Because the cash flows are positively correlated, the average amount that
can be stolen per period is negatively related to the length of the time interval during which
the stealing takes place. Higher balance on the credit line means that the default will occur
sooner if the agent keep stealing cash flows. Thus, to discourage the agent from stealing, a
higher interest rate should be charged on the credit line when the balance is high.
An important aspect of this paper is the methodology, which has independent theoretical
value. We develop a new dynamic programming approach for solving for an optimal contract
(mechanism) in a setting with a correlated privately observed variable, where the standard
dynamic programming technique does not work. The main advantage of our approach is that
it allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the problem and obtain a closed-form solution for
the optimal contract in our setting. We also believe that this approach is not only applicable
to our setting, but can also be used in other dynamic principal-agent models with correlated
hidden states.
1.1 Related Literature
A number of papers study optimal contracting in a setting in which an agent has an ability
to divert cash flows. In a simple one-period model, Diamond (1984) demonstrates that the
optimal contract is debt, where the agent’s incentives to make payments to lenders are given
in terms of non-pecuniary bankruptcy penalties. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) consider a
similar two-period model, in which the investor can threaten to cut oﬀ funding in the second
period if the firm defaults in the first. This threat induces the firm to share the first period
profit with the investor. In a dynamic setting with asymmetric information, Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2004) demonstrate that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal
lending agreements.
The two studies that are most closely related to ours are DeMarzo and Fishman (2003),
and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2004). Both of these papers study long-term financial contract-
ing in a setting with privately observed independent cash flows. Unlike previous analyses,
we allow cash flows to be correlated over time. It turns out that the correlation significantly
changes the optimal contract between the agent and the investor. While in DeMarzo and
Fishman (2003), and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2004) the optimal contract can be implemented
4
using a credit line with a constant interest rate, we find that the implementation of the op-
timal contract in our setting requires a credit line from the investor with a variable interest
rate. Since the presence of correlation of cash flows is overwhelming in practice, our model
is a more realistic approximation of the reality, and should better fit the data.
Recent empirical studies support the theory that performance pricing and other debt
covenants are used to mitigate agency costs. Analyzing a large database of commercial
loans, Asquith, Beatty and Weber (2004) report that debt contracts are more likely to in-
clude performance pricing when re-contracting, adverse selection, and moral hazard costs are
higher. They also estimate that more than 50% of debt contracts have performance pricing
requirements. While using the same database, Bradley and Roberts (2004) come to the con-
clusion that debt covenants are used to reduce the agency cost of debt. Dichev and Skinner
(2004) relate the existence of debt covenants to informational asymmetries between lenders
and borrowers, which may cause agency problems.
On the technical side, this paper develops a recursive method to solve for an optimal
incentive-compatible contract in a setting in which a privately observed state variable is
correlated over time. The vast majority of the literature on optimal contracting assumes,
however, that privately observed economic variables are independent over time. In this lit-
erature, an optimal contract typically depends on a history of publicly observed outcomes,
which is a multi-dimensional object. However, it is often possible to rewrite the problem
recursively, summarizing all the relevant information in the history by a one-dimensional
object - a continuation value. Green (1987), Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), Phelan
and Townsend (1991), Korcherlakota (1996), DeMarzo and Fishman (2002), DeMarzo and
Fishman (2003), among many others, utilize this approach.
Surprisingly, there are only a few papers that allow for correlation of privately observed
variables. Fernandes and Phelan (2000) consider a dynamic model with a risk-averse agent
whose endowment follows a first-order Markov process. Quadrini (2003) uses the method-
ology developed by Fernandes and Phelan (2000) to solve a dynamic principal-agent model
with privately observed persistent shocks. Doepke and Townsend (2001) develop several new
recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent models with hid-
den income and hidden actions. These papers resort to numerical simulations to characterize
optimal contracts.
Our approach to solving an agency problem with history dependence is quite diﬀerent
from the methodology of Fernandes and Phelan (2000). Their method requires computation
of the continuation functions that depend, not only on the state variable and the agent’s
continuation payoﬀ, but also on the agent’s deviation payoﬀ. Although their method can
be used in our setting for numerical simulations, the higher dimensionality of their method
makes it virtually intractable analytically.
Battaglini (2004) obtains a closed form solution for the optimal contract between a mo-
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nopolist and a consumer whose preferences follow a two-state Markov process and are un-
observable by the monopolist. The consumer has unlimited wealth and the consumer’s type
at time zero is unknown to the monopolist. According to the optimal contract, the monop-
olist screens the consumer’s type by distorting consumption of the low type. The contract
instantly becomes eﬃcient as soon as the consumer reveals his type is high. In a related pa-
per, Battaglini and Coate (2004) study optimal income taxation of individuals whose income
generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov process. The major distinction
of our paper from Battaglini (2004), and Battaglini and Coate (2004) is that the agent has
limited wealth in our setting. As a result, the first best cannot be implemented even when the
cash flow is high. Consequently, the structure of the optimal contract in our setting is quite
diﬀerent from that in Battaglini (2004), and Battaglini and Coate (2004). In particular, in
their papers, the optimal contract depends only on whether the agent has ever reported the
high type, at which point the contract becomes first best. Here, the contract remains second
best even after multiple reports of the high cash flows, and the optimal contract depends on
history through a continuous variable, the balance on the credit line.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the dynamic contracting model
with correlated privately-observed cash flows. Section 3 contains a preliminary analysis of
the contracting problem. Section 4 provides the derivation of the optimal contract. Section
5 demonstrates that the optimal contract can be implemented by a combination of equity, a
coupon bond and a credit line with an escalating interest rate. Section 6 extends the model
to the continuous time setting. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
A risk-neutral agent evaluates consumption sequences {Ct} according to
P
t β
tE[Ct], where β
is the intertemporal discount factor. The agent has a special human capital to run a project
that generates stochastic cash flows {Yt}. The agent’s initial wealth W is not suﬃcient to
initiate the project that requires a fixed initial investment I > W . To raise the lacking
capital, the agent will have to enter into a contractual relationship with an investor who is
also risk-neutral and has suﬃcient financial resources. The discount factor for the investor is
also β, which corresponds to the risk-free interest rate r = 1β − 1.
The cash flows generated by the project are correlated over time. For simplicity, let the
cash flows follow a two-state Markov chain: Yt ∈ {yL, yH} for all t, where 0 ≤ yL < yH . We
will refer to yL and yH as the low and the high cash flows respectively. Let Q(y) denote the
probability that Yt = yH , given the previous period cash flow realization y ∈ {yL, yH}:
Q(y) = Pr (Yt = yH |Yt−1 = y) .
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The cash flows are assumed to be positively correlated, which in terms of transition proba-
bilities means that Q (yH) > Q (yL) . One can verify that this implies that an expectation of
a future cash flow is always higher in the high state:
E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ] > E [Yt+k|Yt = yL] , (1)
where k = 1, 2, ... For more on the properties of the cash flow process, see Lemma 5 in
Appendix.
The agent privately observes realizations of the cash flows, while the investor must rely
on the agent to report the cash flow realizations, without being able to verify the agent’s
reports. We assume that the low cash flow yL is observable and collectible by the investor,
but the agent can secretly divert the excess cash flow yH−yL for his own consumption. Cash
flow diversion may be costly for the agent. It is assumed that the agent is able to enjoy
only a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of the diverted amount. The fraction (1− λ) represents the cost of
stealing, which can be attributed to diﬀerent kinds of expenses and ineﬃciencies associated
with the conspiracy. The agent can consume diverted cash flows immediately or save them
at the interest rate ρ ≤ r at his private bank account.
We interpret diversion of the firm’s cash flows as stealing. We assume that the agent
can secretly transfer money from the firm’s account to his own account using accounting
manipulations. However, other activities that benefit the agent at the expense of the investor
and are not observable by the investor may fit the setting of the model as well. For example,
the agent can ineﬃciently use the firm’s cash flows in order to receive non monetary benefits,
such as corporate jets. The fact that the agent cannot save non-monitary benefits is not
essential here, since, as we will see it later, savings cannot improve the agent’s payoﬀ anyway.
The agent has limited liability: he can quit at any time and get his reservation payoﬀ Rt.
For ease of presentation, we normalize the agent’s reservation payoﬀ to zero: Rt = 0, which
means that the agent will never quit voluntarily. In addition, it is assumed, for technical
reasons, that the project has a finite life, with T being the final date.
In exchange for the funding, the investor gains the right to take control over the project.
We refer to it as the liquidation of the project. If the project is liquidated at date t, the
investor sells the project’s assets and collects the liquidation value Lt, while the agent is
left with his reservation value Rt. All the subsequent cash flows are permanently lost. We
assume that the liquidation is ineﬃcient, in the sense that the liquidation value is strictly
below the expected value of the cash flows lost in the case of liquidation. The ineﬃciency
may be caused by friction costs associated with a transfer of control, or by the fact that the
agent’s unique human capital is required to run the project eﬃciently. We assume that the
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Period  t 
Agent privately 
observes cash flow 
tY  
 
Agent pays  
tyˆ   
to investor 
Investor  pays 
td  
to agent 
Investor can 
liquidate project 
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
value of the liquidated firm in period t is given by
Lt (yt) =
TX
k=t+1
βk−tyL + α
TX
k=t+1
βk−tE [Yk − yL|Yt = yt] , (2)
where α ≤ 1. According to (2), the investor is able to recover the full value of the future
minimum cash flows and the fraction α of the value of the future excess cash flows. The
liquidation is strictly ineﬃcient when α < 1.
If the investor agrees to fund the project, at date 0 the agent and the investor sign a
contract that will govern their relationship until the final date T . According to the contract,
the agent must report realizations of the cash flows to the investor. Of course, the reported
cash flow yˆt can be diﬀerent from the true realization yt. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the contract requires that the agent pays the reported cash flows to the investor
immediately. The contract also specifies transfer payment dt to the agent and the probability
of liquidation pt after any history of the agent’s reports. Specifically, given the history
yˆt = {yˆ1, ..., yˆt} of the agent’s reports, the contract obligates the investor to make a payment
of dt
¡
yˆt
¢
≥ 0 to the agent, and liquidate the project with the probability pt
¡
yˆt
¢
at the end
of period t. The sequence of the events is illustrated in Figure 1.
We will study contracts with full commitment. No renegotiation of the terms of the
contract is allowed. A contract is optimal if it maximizes the investor’s continuation payoﬀ
subject to a certain payoﬀ for the agent.
3 Preliminary Analysis of the Dynamic Contracting Problem
In order to solve for the optimal contract between the agent and the investor, we need to
find the transfers dt
¡
yˆt
¢
and the probabilities of liquidation pt
¡
yˆt
¢
for each possible history
of the reports yˆt at each time t that maximize the expected payoﬀ for the investor at time
zero, given the expected payoﬀ a0 for the agent. Since the number of possible histories double
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each period, the dimensionality of the problem increases exponentially with T . In order to
deal with the high dimensionality of the problem, we have to rewrite the problem recursively.
We start our analysis of the contracting problem by showing that the optimal contract can
be implemented using a direct revelation mechanism without savings. We then show that
the optimal contract is incentive compatible if and only if there is no profitable one-period
deviation from the truth telling strategy.
3.1 Optimality of a Truth-Telling Contract without Savings
We start our analysis of the model by showing that we can restrict our attention to the set
of contracts in which the agent always tells the truth and does not save.
For any contract σ = (d, p), the agent chooses an optimal strategy ϕ = (yˆ, C, S) that,
apart from the reporting strategy yˆ, also includes the agent’s consumption C, and saving
S, as functions of the history yt of the cash flow realizations. At every date t, the agent’s
consumption Ct, and the savings St must be non-negative. The agent’s income
it = dt + ζ(yt, yˆt)
consists of two components: the transfer dt from the investor and the diﬀerence ζ(yt, yˆt)
between the reported cash flow yˆt and the actual cash flow realization yt:
ζ(yt, yˆt) = λ (yt − yˆt)+ − (yt − yˆt)− .
Note, that ζ(yt, yˆt) can be negative, since the agent can use his savings to overreport cash
flows.
One can use a Revelation-Principle type of logic to show that, for any contract σ = (d, p),
there exists a contract σ0 = (d0, p0) that results in the same payoﬀ for the agent and equal
or greater payoﬀ for the investor, and for which truth-telling is the optimal strategy for the
agent. Indeed, suppose the reporting strategy y˜ is optimal under the contract σ, then define
d0t
¡
yˆt
¢
= dt
¡
y˜t(yˆt)
¢
+ζ(yˆt, y˜t(yˆt)), and p0t
¡
yˆt
¢
= pt
¡
y˜t(yˆt)
¢
, for every history yˆt of the agent’s
reports. One can see that if the agent tells the truth under σ0, then his income in each period
is equal to the income he receives under σ when he employs strategy y˜; and the investor’s
payoﬀ under σ0 is no less than under the old contract3. In addition, the truth-telling is
optimal under σ0, since y˜ is the optimal strategy under σ.
Savings are not necessary for the agent because the agent is risk-neutral. Since the
agent finds it optimal to tell the truth under the contract σ0, he never uses his savings to
misrepresent cash flows. Thus, savings translate into delayed consumption. Since the agent
3Since fraction (1− λ) of the diverted cash flows is wasted, the investor’s income under the contract σ0 can
be actually higher than that under the contract σ, since the agent never diverts cash flows under the contract
σ.
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is risk-neutral, he receives no benefits from consumption smoothing.
This leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 There exists an optimal contract that induces the agent to report cash flows
truthfully and maintain zero savings.
3.2 Temporary Incentive Compatibility Constraints
Given the result of Proposition 1, we will focus on direct-revelation contracts with no savings
for the agent. To facilitate our analysis, we assume that the agent is not allowed to save,
which implies that the agent cannot report yH when yL is realized. After finding an optimal
contract without savings, we will verify that the contract remains incentive compatible when
the agent is allowed to save. We say that the reporting strategy yˆ is feasible if and only if
yˆt ≤ yt, where yˆt ∈ {yL, yH}.4
First, we prove that the contract is incentive compatible if and only if at any point of
time the agent’s continuation payoﬀs satisfy temporary incentive compatibility constraints.
The agent’s reporting strategy yˆ is a sequence
©
yˆt
¡
yt
¢ªT
t=1 of the agent’s reports about
the cash flow realizations. If the agent reports yˆt, given the actual cash flow yt, his net income
in period t is given by yt− yˆt+dt
¡
yˆt
¢
. Let Pt
¡
yˆt
¢
be the probability that the project is active
at the beginning of period t after the history yˆt of reports, under the contract σ = (d, p).
One can verify that Pt
¡
yˆt
¢
=
t−1Q
k=1
¡
1− pt
¡
yˆk
¢¢
. The reporting strategy yˆ under the contract
σ results in the following expected payoﬀ for the agent:
a0 (y0, yˆ, σ) = E
"
TX
t=1
βtPt
¡
yˆt
¢ ¡
λ(Yt − yˆt) + dt
¡
yˆt
¢¢ |Y0 = y0# . (3)
Note that the agent’s payoﬀ also depends on the initial state y0.
We say that a contract σ = (d, p) is incentive compatible if it induces the agent never to
misreport the cash flows. That is, for any reporting strategies yˆ,
E
"
TX
t=1
βtPt
¡
yt
¢
dt
¡
yt
¢ |Y0 = y0# ≥ E " TX
t=1
βtPt
¡
yˆt
¢ ¡
λ(Yt − yˆt) + dt
¡
yˆt
¢¢ |Y0 = y0# . (4)
Under an incentive compatible contract, the agent’s best strategy is to truthfully reveal
the cash flows in every period. Will the truth-telling strategy remain optimal on an oﬀ-
4The agent can, of course, report a cash flow yˆ, which is greater than yL, but less than yH . Such a reporting
strategy cannot be optimal for the agent under the optimal contract, since it would immediately reveal that
the true cash flow was yH and the agent stole (yH − yˆ). Under the optimal contract, the investor commits to
punish the agent for stealing by liquidating the project immediately if the agent reports anything other than
yL or yH . Hence, the agent strictly prefers to report yL over yˆ ∈ (yL, yH).
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equilibrium path? The next result shows that an incentive compatible contract remains
incentive compatible even if the agent has deviated from truth-telling in the past.
Lemma 1 Under any incentive compatible contract, at any point of time, the agent (weakly)
prefers to tell the truth, even if he has lied in the past.
Proof. See Appendix.
After a realization of cash flow yH the agent has a dilemma. He can either tell the truth
and report the high cash flow, or report the low cash flow and consume the stolen λ (yH − yL).
Reporting yH truthfully means choosing a continuation contract that follows after the report
yH , while reporting yL and diverting yH − yL means choosing a continuation contract that
follows after the report yL. Let the continuation contract σt
¡
yˆt
¢
correspond to the history yˆt
of the agent’s reports. The terms of this contract depend on the reported cash flows, but not
on the actual realizations of the cash flows. However, the last cash flow realization matters
for the agent’s and the investor’s continuation payoﬀs, because it determines the distribution
of the future cash flows.
Let’s consider a one-time deviation from the truth-telling strategy. Suppose Yt = yH .
Given a history yt of the cash flows realizations, such that the project can be active in period
t, i.e. Pt
¡
yt
¢
> 0, the agent’s continuation payoﬀ under the truth-telling strategy is given by
at
¡
yt−1, yH
¢
= E
"
TX
k=t
βk−t
Pk
¡
yt, yk−t
¢
Pt (yt)
dt
³
yt, yk−t
´
|Yt = yH
#
.
If the agent truthfully reveals the cash flows in each period other than t, but cheats in period
t, the agent’s continuation payoﬀ will be
aˆt
¡
yt−1, yH
¢
= E
"
TX
k=t
βk−t
Pk
¡
yt−1, yL, yk−t
¢
Pt (yt−1, yL)
dt
³
yt−1, yL, y
k−t
´
|Yt = yH
#
.
We will call aˆt
¡
yt−1, yH
¢
the deviation continuation payoﬀ after history
¡
yt−1, yH
¢
.
The next theorem says that the contract is incentive compatible if and only if there is no
one-time profitable deviation for the agent.
Theorem 1 The contract σ = (d, p) is incentive compatible if and only if for all time periods
t ≤ T , and all histories yt−1, such that Pk
¡
yt−1
¢
> 0,
at
¡
yt−1, yH
¢
≥ aˆt
¡
yt−1, yH
¢
+ λ(yH − yL). (5)
Proof. See Appendix.
Equation (5) says that, under the contract σ, the agent does not find it optimal to
deviate from the truth-telling strategy for one period. We will interpret equation (5) as
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the temporary incentive compatibility constraint. Theorem 1 establishes that a contract is
incentive compatible if and only if at any point of time temporary incentive compatibility
constraints are satisfied. We will use this property later when we formulate the contracting
problem recursively.
3.3 Contracting Problem
The investor’s income in each period is given by the diﬀerence between the reported cash flow
yˆt and the payment to the agent dt and the proceeds Lt from the asset liquidation. Given
the initial state y0 and the continuation payoﬀ a0 for the agent, the investor’s problem is to
choose an incentive compatible contract σ = (d, p) that maximizes the investor’s payoﬀ:
b0(y0, a0) = max
d,p
E0
"
TX
t=1
βtPt
¡
yt
¢ ¡
Yt − dt(yt) + pt
¡
yt
¢
Lt
¢ |Y0 = y0# , (6)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
E
"
TX
t=1
βtPt
¡
yt
¢
dt
¡
yt
¢ |Y0 = y0# ≥ E " TX
t=1
βtPt
¡
yˆt
¢ ¡
λ(Yt − yˆt) + dt
¡
yˆt
¢¢ |Y0 = y0# , (7)
for all feasible reporting strategies yˆ, and the promise keeping constraint
a0 = E0
"
TX
t=1
βtPt
¡
yt
¢
dt
¡
yt
¢ |Y0# , (8)
where yt = {y1, ...yt} denotes the history of the cash flow realizations.
An optimal contract solves the investor’s problem given by (6)-(8). Any other contract
results in a payoﬀ for the investor being equal to or lower than b0(y0, a0), given the agent’s
payoﬀ a0. Thus, function b0(y0, a0) represents the highest possible payoﬀ attainable by the
investor, given the payoﬀ a0 for the agent and the initial state y0.
Solving for the contracting problem (6)-(8) means finding the optimal transfers dt
¡
yˆt
¢
and the optimal probabilities of liquidation pt
¡
yˆt
¢
for each possible history yˆt of the reports
at each time t. Since the number of possible histories double each period, the number of
unknown variables in the problem is given by 2
¡
2T − 1
¢
. In order to deal with the high
dimensionality of the problem, we have to rewrite the problem recursively.
3.4 Recursive Formulation of the Contracting Problem
The setting of our model is similar to DeMarzo and Fishman (2003). However, unlike previous
analyses, we allow the cash flows to be positively correlated over time. This is an important
assumption not only because it is a more realistic assumption than independent cash flows,
but also because the correlation creates an additional degree of informational asymmetry
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between the agent and the investor. With the correlated cash flows, the agent has a superior
knowledge not only about the current cash flow realization that he observes directly, but also
about the future cash flows, since their distribution is determined by the current cash flow.
By misrepresenting the current cash flow the agent also misrepresents the true quality of the
project.
The correlation assumption is also a costly assumption. The vast majority of literature
on dynamic contracting assumes that privately observed variables are independent over time.
This gets us common knowledge of preferences over continuation contracts. With the corre-
lated cash flows, preferences over continuation contracts are no longer common knowledge.
Therefore, standard techniques of dynamic programming do not work, and we need to develop
our own techniques in order to solve the contracting problem.
3.4.1 Recursive Formulation of the Contracting Problem with Independent Cash
Flows
Before approaching the contracting problem with the correlated cash flows, it may be useful
to see how standard techniques of dynamic programming can be applied in the case with
independent cash flows, and why these techniques do not work with correlated cash flows.
When the cash flows are independent over time, at any point of time continuation payoﬀs
for the agent and the investor associated with the continuation contracts do not depend on
the current cash flow realization. Since the investor has the complete knowledge of the agent’s
preferences over continuation contracts one can formulate the dynamic contracting problem
recursively using the continuation payoﬀ for the agent as a state variable. The key element
of the recursive formulation is the way temporary incentive compatibility constraints are
written. Let adt (yL) and a
d
t (yH) denote payoﬀs for the agent under the optimal continuation
contracts after the agent reports the low and the high cash flow respectively. The agent
truthfully reveals the cash flow realization in period t if
adt (yH) ≥ adt (yL) + λ (yH − yL) . (9)
Given incentive compatibility constraint (9), one can compute the optimal contract by back-
ward induction, using the continuation payoﬀ adt as a single state variable. According to
the recursive procedure used by DeMarzo and Fishman (2003), the investor maximizes his
continuation payoﬀ in each period by choosing continuation payoﬀs for the agent subject
to the incentive compatibility constraints. Each continuation payoﬀ for the agent uniquely
determines the optimal continuation contract. Thus, choosing continuation payoﬀs for the
agent is equivalent to choosing optimal continuation contracts. Since the optimal contract is
computed by backward induction starting from the last period for each possible continuation
payoﬀ for the agent, one can use the agent’s continuation payoﬀ adt as a state variable in
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order to formulate the problem recursively.
3.4.2 Recursive Formulation of the Contracting Problem with Markov Cash
Flows
The above approach is not applicable in the setting with correlated cash flows since the
incentive compatibility constraint (9) is no longer true. Figure 2 demonstrates how the
incentive compatibility conditions are diﬀerent with the Markov cash flows. Suppose the
expected payoﬀ for the agent at the beginning of period t is ayt . In the i.i.d. case, in order
to induce the agent to reveal the cash flow realization truthfully, the agent’s continuation
payoﬀ adt (yH) after he reports the high cash flow should be higher than a
y
t and the agent’s
continuation payoﬀ adt (yL) after he reports the low cash flow should be lower than a
y
t , so that
IC constraint (9) holds. However, when the cash flows are positively correlated over time,
a continuation contract that results in the continuation payoﬀ adt (yL) for the agent in the
low state will result in the agent’s payoﬀ aˆdt (yL), if the agent reports the low cash flow when
the high cash flow is actually realized. Since the future cash flows are more likely to be high
when the current state is high, aˆdt (yL) > a
d
t (yL). Thus the incentive compatibility constraint
with the Markov cash flows can be written as
adt (yH) ≥ aˆdt (yL) + λ (yH − yL) . (10)
While adt (yL) represents the agent’s continuation payoﬀ in equilibrium, aˆ
d
t (yL) is the
agent’s continuation payoﬀ in deviation. Fernandes and Phelan (2000) use both the contin-
uation payoﬀ in equilibrium and the continuation payoﬀ in deviation as state variables to
formulate their contracting problem recursively. However, this method requires computa-
tion of the continuation functions that depend on the two state variables. Although their
method can be used in our setting for numerical simulations, the higher dimensionality of
their method makes it virtually intractable analytically.
Our approach to solving the contracting problem is to formulate it recursively using the
agent’s continuation payoﬀ in equilibrium as a single state variable. We will do so by finding
the relationship between the agent’s continuation payoﬀ in the low state adt (yL) and the
agent’s continuation payoﬀ in deviation aˆdt (yL). Both a
d
t (yL) and aˆ
d
t (yL) are related to the
same continuation contract. The only diﬀerence between these two payoﬀs is that the first
payoﬀ is obtained using the distribution of the future cash flows conditional on the low state,
while the second payoﬀ is obtained using the distribution of the future cash flows conditional
on the high state. Using backward induction, we find function ct that relates these two
payoﬀs:
aˆdt (yL) = ct
³
adt (yL)
´
.
14
( )dt Ha y  
( )dt La y
λ(yH-yL) y
ta
i.i.d. cash flows 
y
ta
( )dt La y
( )dt Ha y
ˆ ( )dt La y  
λ(yH-yL) 
Markov cash flows 
Figure 2: Incentive compatibility with independent and Markov cash flows.
Function ct is monotonic in its argument, which is not surprising: an optimal continuation
contract that yields higher payoﬀ for the agent in the low state should also yield a higher
payoﬀ in the high state. Using function ct we can write down the incentive compatibility
constraint with the Markov cash flows as follows:
adt (yH) ≥ ct
³
adt (yL)
´
+ λ (yH − yL) . (11)
The main diﬀerence between (10) and (11) is that (11) depends only on the equilibrium
payoﬀ for the agent, while (10) depends on both equilibrium and deviation payoﬀs. When
function ct is an identity, equation (11) is equivalent to (9). Thus, the IC constraint with
independent cash flows (9) is a special case of the IC constraint with Markov cash flows(11).
Exploiting the similarities between (11) and (9), in particular the fact that the IC constraint
(11) is expressed in terms of the equilibrium payoﬀs only, we will adopt the dynamic pro-
gramming techniques with independent cash flows to the Markov case in Section 4.
4 The Optimal Contract
In this section, we solve for the optimal contract. First, in order to rewrite the contracting
problem recursively, we conjecture that the optimal contract is sequentially optimal. Second,
given the conjecture, we solve for the optimal contract using a dynamic programming tech-
nique. A key ingredient of our technique is that, in order to write down temporary incentive
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compatibility constraints, we calculate the agent’s continuation payoﬀs in the high state as
a function of the agent’s continuation payoﬀs in the low state under the optimal contract.
Third, we verify that the contract we derive under the sequential optimality conjecture is
indeed the best possible contract. Finally, we talk about initiating the optimal contract.
4.1 Sequential Optimality Conjecture
Recall the definition of an optimal contract. We say that an incentive-compatible contract
σ that implements payoﬀs a0 (y0|σ) and b0 (y0|σ) for the agent and the investor respectively
is optimal at state y0 if there is no other incentive-compatible contract σ˜ with the same
payoﬀ for the agent, but with a higher payoﬀ for the investor: a0 (y0|σ˜) = a0 (y0|σ) and
b0 (y0|σ˜) > b0 (y0|σ). This definition is based on the time zero payoﬀs.
In a similar manner, letting at (yt|σt) and bt (yt|σt) denote continuation payoﬀs for the
agent and the investor under a continuation contract σt, we can define an optimal continuation
contract at any point of time:
Definition 1 An incentive-compatible continuation contract σt is optimal at state yt if
there is no other incentive-compatible continuation contract σ˜t such that at (yt|σ˜t) = at (yt|σt)
and bt (yt|σ˜t) > bt (yt|σt).
We may think about an optimal continuation contract as the best incentive-compatible
contract for the investor that can be written at time t, given the agent receives a certain
continuation payoﬀ. Note that the definition of the optimality of a continuation contract at
time t does not depend on what happened before time t. A natural question is whether a
contract that is optimal at time zero will remain optimal in the future. To address this issue
we need the following definition:
Definition 2 An incentive-compatible contract is sequentially optimal if at any point of
time, after any history, its continuation contracts are optimal.
The definition of an optimal contract does not ensure its optimality in the future, while the
definition of a sequentially optimal contract does not guarantee that such a contract exists.
However, it is natural to conjecture that an optimal contract is also sequentially optimal:
Conjecture 1 There exists a sequentially optimal contract.
In other words, we conjecture that the optimal contract not only maximizes the investor’s
expected payoﬀ at time zero for a given initial payoﬀ for the agent, but also maximizes the
investor’s continuation payoﬀ at any point of time in the future, given the corresponding
continuation payoﬀ for the agent. Although the statement of Conjecture 1 is true in the case
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when the cash flows are independent over time5, there is no obvious way to prove Conjecture
1 when the cash flows are correlated over time. We will show that a sequentially optimal
contract exists. We will do it in two steps. First, we conjecture that the optimal contract is
sequentially optimal. We will use this conjecture to justify our recursive algorithm to derive
an optimal contract σ∗. Second, we will verify that the derived contact σ∗ is optimal by
showing there is no other contract that can improve on σ∗.
4.2 Sequentially Optimal Contract
In this section, we derive a sequentially optimal contract using a recursive procedure. This
procedure requires, that at any point of time, all the relevant information contained in the
history is summarized by the two state variables: the realization of the last cash flow and the
agent’s continuation payoﬀ. Conjecture 1 allows us to split the multidimensional optimization
problem (6)-(8) into a sequence of optimization problems of smaller dimensionality.
An optimal contract solves the investor’s problem given by (6)-(8). The solution of the
problem gives us the function b0 (y0, a0) that represents the highest possible payoﬀ attainable
by the investor, given the payoﬀ a0 for the agent and the initial state y0. We will refer
to b0(y0, a0) as the continuation function at time zero. In a similar manner, we can define
continuation functions at any point of time in the future.
In each period t < T , the sequence of the following events takes place. First, the agent
privately observes the realization of the cash flow Yt. If Yt = yH , the agent decides whether
to pay the cash flow to the investor, or divert it for his own consumption and report yL.
If Yt = yL, the agent has no choice other than to report the cash flow yL. Given the
agent’s payment, the investor, in accordance with the contract, makes a decision regarding
the termination of the project. In the case of termination, the agent’s payoﬀ is zero, and
the investor’s payoﬀ is Lt. If the project is not terminated, it continues to operate in the
next period. For each period, we consider the start-of-period, intra-period (just prior to
the termination decision), and end-of-period continuation functions, denoted by byt (yt−1, a
y
t ),
bdt (yt, a
d
t ), b
e
t (yt, a
e
t ) correspondingly, where a
y
t , a
d
t , and a
e
t denote the agent’s continuation
payoﬀs at the start, middle and end of period t respectively, as shown in Figure 3.
In particular, byt (yt−1, a
y
t ) denotes the highest possible payoﬀ attainable by the investor
in period t before the cash flow Yt is realized, given the agent’s continuation payoﬀs a
y
t at
the beginning of period t and the realization yt−1 of the cash flow Yt−1; bdt (yt, a
d
t ) denotes the
highest possible payoﬀ attainable by the investor in period t after the cash flow Yt is realized
but before the liquidation decision is made, given the agent’s continuation payoﬀs adt at that
time and the realization yt of the cash flow Yt; bet (yt, a
e
t ) denotes the highest possible payoﬀ
attainable by the investor in period t after the liquidation decision is made, given the agent’s
continuation payoﬀs aet at the end of period t and the realization yt of the cash flow Yt.
5See for example, DeMarzo and Fishman (2003)
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Figure 3: Continuation functions
Conjecture 1 allows us to calculate the optimal contract recursively. If a continuation
contract σt+1 is optimal at time t, then we can use σt+1 to calculate a continuation contract
σt that is optimal at time t − 1. In particular, given continuation function byt+1, we can
obtain continuation function bet , taking into account discounting between periods. In order to
calculate continuation function bdt , we calculate the optimal liquidation policy and the optimal
transfer in period t. Along the way, we calculate the agent’s deviation payoﬀ ct
¡
adt (yL)
¢
as a
function of the agent’ equilibrium payoﬀ adt (yL) in the low state. Function b
y
t is obtained from
bdt by optimizing the investor’s payoﬀ at the beginning of period t, subject to the incentive
compatibility constraint and the promise keeping constraint.
We start computing the continuation functions from the final period T . At the end of
the final period, the project is liquidated, and no cash flows will be generated in the future.
However, a transfer from the investor to the agent is allowed. Due to the limited liability of
the agent, this transfer must be non-negative. Hence, the continuation function at the end
of the last period is given by
beT (yT , a
e
T ) =
(
−aeT for aeT ≥ 0
−∞ for aeT < 0
,
where the agent’s continuation payoﬀ aeT is the final payment from the investor.
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4.3 Parametric Representation of Continuation Payoﬀs
In this subsection, we introduce a convenient way to represent the agent’s continuation pay-
oﬀs. Since the cash flows are correlated, the agent’s continuation payoﬀs depend not only
on the terms of the contact, but also on the last cash flow realization, which determines
the distribution of the future cash flows. It turns out, as we will see later, this dependence
can be conveniently incorporated into the agent’s continuation payoﬀs, if these payoﬀs are
represented in terms of the values of the cash flows that the agent can steal during a certain
time interval.
For continuous time τ ∈ <, let nτ be the biggest integer, such that nτ ≤ τ , and lτ = τ−nτ .
We will use τ to denote a time interval of nτ periods and the fraction lτ of the next period.
Given Yt = y, the value of the cash flows that can be diverted by the agent during time τ
starting from period t+ 1 is given by
Vτ (y) ≡ E
"
nτX
k=1
βk (Yt+k − yL) + lτβ(nτ+1)(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt = y
#
. (12)
Here, we assume that if the project operates a fraction lτ of a period, then only the fraction lτ
of the cash flow realized in that period is counted. Alternatively, we can say that lτ represents
the probability that the agent will be allowed to run the project in the period t + nτ + 1.
Note that due to the Markov property of the cash flows, the current date t is irrelevant for
the value of Vτ .
Function Vτ has a number of good properties.
Lemma 2 Function Vτ (Yt) is continuous, strictly increasing in τ , and is piecewise linear,
with the right-hand-side derivative
∂Vτ (y)
∂τ
= β(nτ+1)E [(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt = y] . (13)
Moreover,
Vτ+1(Yt−1) = E [β ((Yt − yL) + Vτ (Yt)) |Yt−1] . (14)
Proof. See Appendix.
The equation (14) is self-evident. Its left-hand side is the value of the cash flows that can
be stolen during time τ + 1, while the right-hand side represents the same value as a sum of
the next period excess cash flow (Yt− yL), and the value of the cash flows that can be stolen
during time τ . The derivative (13) is obtained from (12), using the fact that lτ = τ − nτ .
We will use Vτ (·) to represent continuation payoﬀs for the agent. For example, if Yt = yL,
and the agent’s continuation payoﬀ at the end of period t is a > 0, then there exists unique
τ > 0 such that a = Vτ (yL). Thus, given state yL, the agent’s continuation payoﬀ of a is
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equivalent to the expected value of the cash flows that can be stolen between time t+ 1 and
time t+ 1 + τ .
Two values of the agent’s continuation payoﬀs have special meaning: V1 (yt) is the ex-
pected present value of the cash flow that can be stolen in the next period by the agent, while
VT−t (yt) is the expected present value of the cash flows that the project can generate if it
operates until the final date T without liquidation. Agent’s continuation payoﬀs in period
t that are less than λV1 (yt) cannot be implemented without liquidating the project with
positive probability at the end of period t.
The only case when a continuation contract does not ever require liquidation is when the
agent’s continuation payoﬀ is no less than λVT−t (yt), which is the value of the cash flows
the agent is able to steal running the project until the final date T . The optimal contract
looks especially easy in this situation. The investor pays to the agent the diﬀerence between
the agent’s continuation payoﬀ and λVT−t (yt) immediately and lets the agent consume the
fraction λ of all subsequent excess cash flows. In this case, the continuation function at the
end of period t is given by
bet (yt, a
e
t ) =
TX
s=t+1
βs−tE [Ys|Yt = yt]− aet for aet ≥ λVT−t (yt) . (15)
When the agent continuation payoﬀ aet is below λVT−t (yt), the threat of liquidation must be
real. Otherwise, the agent can steal all the subsequent excess cash flows and get the payoﬀ
λVT−t (yt).
4.4 Derivation of the Sequentially Optimal Contract
Now, we are in a position to present the algorithm which will allow us to derive the sequen-
tially optimal contract σ∗. This algorithm consists of three steps for each period.
4.4.1 Step One: Liquidation Problem
Consider the problem the investor faces after the cash flow announcement but before the
liquidation decision. If the project is terminated in period t, the investor’s payoﬀ is Lt, while
the agent gets nothing. Given the continuation function bet (yt, ·) and the agent’s continuation
payoﬀ adt , the optimal probability of liquidation pt solves
bdt
³
yt, adt
´
= max
pt, aet
(1− pt)bet (yt, aet ) + ptLt (16)
s.t. adt = (1− pt)aet , (17)
aet ≥ λV1 (yt) , (18)
pt ∈ [0, 1] (19)
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where equation (17) ensures that the agent’s continuation payoﬀ adt before the liquidation
decision is consistent with the continuation payoﬀ aet after the liquidation decision. Constraint
(18) reflects the fact that once the project is allowed to continue into the next period, the
agent’s end-of-period payoﬀ must be at least as high as the expected present value of the
cash flow aL (yt) ≡ λV1 (yt) that the agent is capable of stealing in the next period. This also
implies that if the agent’s intra-period continuation payoﬀ adt is below a
L
t (yt), the investor
must liquidate the project in period t with positive probability.
The next proposition states that the project is terminated with positive probability if and
only if adt (Yt) drops below a
L (Yt).
Proposition 2 The probability of the termination in period t is given by
p
³
Yt, adt
´
=
(
aL(Yt)−adt
aL(Yt)
for adt ∈ [0, aL (Yt))
0 for adt ≥ aL (Yt)
. (20)
The intra-period continuation function bdt (Yt, a
d
t ) is obtained from the end-of-period con-
tinuation function bet (Yt, ·) as follows:
bdt (Yt, a
d
t ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−∞ for adt (Yt) < 0
adt
aL(Yt)
bet (Yt, a
L (Yt)) +
³
1− a
d
t
aL(Yt)
´
Lt for adt ∈ [0, aL (Yt))
bet (Yt, a
d
t ) for a
d
t > a
L (Yt)
. (21)
If the project is not terminated in period t the agent’s continuation payoﬀ evolves as
follows:
aet = min
³
λVT−t (Yt) , max
³
adt , a
L (Yt)
´´
.
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. It is strongly recommended to finish
reading this section first before reading the proof, since the proof relies on other results of
this section. We prove Proposition 2 and the other propositions in this section all together
through a backward induction argument. Assuming that the statements of these propositions
are true in the subsequent periods, we prove that they must be true in the current period.
The intuition behind this result is simple. The termination of the project is ineﬃcient.
Therefore, the investor finds it optimal to refrain from early liquidation, unless she has ex-
hausted all other means of providing proper incentives for the agent. Once the investor is in
a position in which she has to resort to the liquidation, the probability of the liquidation is
the smallest one that allows her to implement the agent’s continuation payoﬀ. This proba-
bility is proportional to how much the agent’s continuation payoﬀ adt is below the minimal
implementable payoﬀ aL (Yt). If adt < a
L (Yt), and the project was not terminated in period
t, the agent’s continuation payoﬀ at the end of period t is increased to aL (Yt).
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4.4.2 Step Two: Intra-Period Agency Problem
At every point of time, the optimal contract governing the relationship between the investor
and the agent in the future is characterized by two state variables: the realization of the last
cash flow that determines the distribution of the future cash flows, and the promised payoﬀ
for the agent. After observing the realization of Yt, the agent must report the cash flow to the
investor. Let adt (yt) denote the continuation payoﬀ for the agent associated with the optimal
contract if the agent truthfully announces the realization of yt.
An important question is what the agent’s continuation payoﬀ would be if he reports
yL instead of yH . The contract specifies future payments to the agent and termination
probabilities as a function of the history of the agent’s reports. In this sense, the terms of
the future contract do not depend on whether or not the agent was honest. However, Yt
determines the distribution of future cash flows and, therefore, is relevant for the agent’s
continuation payoﬀ under the continuation contract. If the agent cheats, his continuation
payoﬀ, as we will see, would be higher than adt (yL), since he faces better prospects regarding
future cash flows.
For the contract σ∗, let ct
¡
adt (yL)
¢
denote the continuation payoﬀ for the agent if he
chooses to report yL when yH was actually realized in period t. We write it as a function of
adt (yL), since a
d
t (yL) fully determines the future terms of the optimal contract after yL was
reported. We will refer to ct as the agent’s deviation continuation payoﬀ function.
Given the intra-period continuation function bdt , the start-of-period continuation function
byt is the solution of the following problem:
byt (Yt−1, a
y
t ) = max
adt ( · )
Et
h
Yt + bdt
³
Yt, adt (Yt)
´
|Yt−1
i
(22)
s.t. (IC) adt (yH) ≥ ct
³
adt (yL)
´
+ λ (yH − yL) (23)
(PK) ayt = Et
h
adt (Yt) |Yt−1
i
(24)
(IR) adt (·) ≥ 0. (25)
The start-of-period continuation payoﬀ for the investor is the conditional expectation of
the sum of the cash flow Yt and the intra-period continuation payoﬀ, given by the function
bdt . The intra-period continuation payoﬀ for the agent conditional on realization of Yt, a
d
t (yL)
and adt (yH) must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (IC), and the promise keeping
constraint (PK), and the individual rationality constraint (IR). The first constraint insures
that the agent has no incentive to divert the high cash flow. The second one says that the
payoﬀ ayt promised to the agent at the start of period t is equal to the expected intra-period
continuation payoﬀ. Since the agent has limited liability, his continuation payoﬀ cannot be
negative.
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In the formulation of the problem (22), we explicitly use the conjecture that the contract
σ∗ results in the continuation payoﬀs lying on the upper frontiers of the payoﬀ possibility
sets, represented by the continuation functions bdt (Yt, ·).
Proposition 3 The incentive compatibility constraint binds: for t = 1, ..., T
adt (yH) = ct
³
adt (yL)
´
+ λ (yH − yL) . (26)
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof is interconnected with the proofs of the other propositions in this section.
Proposition 3 allows us to calculate function ct. We will represent the agent’s continuation
payoﬀs using functions Vτ (·). For any adt ≤ λVT−t (yt), there is a unique parameter τ ≤ T − t
such that adt = λVτ (yt).
Proposition 4 Given contract σ∗, if the agent’s continuation payoﬀ in the state yL is
λVτ (yL) for some 0 ≤ τ ≤ T − t , then the agent’s continuation payoﬀ in deviation is
λVτ (yH):
ct (λVτ (yL)) = λVτ (yH) for 0 ≤ τ ≤ T − t. (27)
Proof. See Appendix.
The terms of a continuation contract depend only on the reported cash flows. In this
respect, if the agent reports the low cash flow in the current period he faces the same contin-
uation contract whether or not the true cash flow realization was low. However, the agent’s
continuation payoﬀ depends on the true cash flow realization, since the distribution of future
cash flows is a function of the current cash flow realization. Proposition 4 says that if the
agent’s continuation payoﬀ in the low state is equal to the expected present value of the cash
flows that the agent can steal during next τ periods, then the agent’s continuation payoﬀ in
deviation is equal to the expected present value of the cash flows that the agent can steal
during next τ periods, given the high state in the current period.
Let σ∗t (yL) denote the continuation contract after the agent reports the low cash flow in
period t. Given the probability of liquidation pt in period t under σt (yL), we can represent
the agent’s continuation payoﬀ in equilibrium as the expectation of the agent’s continuation
payoﬀs in the next period:
adt (yL) = E
h
β (1− pt) adt+1 (Yt+1) |Yt = yL
i
, (28)
where adt+1 (Yt+1) denotes the continuation payoﬀ for the agent in period t + 1 under the
continuation contract σ∗t (yL) conditional on the cash flow Yt+1. Similarly, if the agent reports
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Figure 4: Computing function ct for the case without liquidation in period t.
the low cash flow in period t, when, in fact, the high cash flow realized, the same contract
results in the following continuation payoﬀ after the deviation:
ct
³
adt (yL)
´
= E
h
β (1− pt) adt+1 (Yt+1) |Yt = yH
i
. (29)
Given (28)-(29), one can calculate function ct using backward induction. Figure 4 gives
graphical interpretation of the relationship between adt (yL) and ct
¡
adt (yL)
¢
for the case with
pt = 0.
Proposition 4 allows us to calculate the evolution of the agent’s continuation payoﬀs. Since
the continuation payoﬀs adt (yL) and a
d
t (yH) satisfy the promise-keeping constraint (PK) and
the incentive compatibility constraint (IC), which is binding, we can solve equations (PK)
and (IC) for adt (yL) and a
d
t (yH) as functions of a
y
t . This yields the following:
Proposition 5 For the start-of-period continuation payoﬀ given by ayt =
1
βλVτ+1 (Yt−1), with
0 ≤ τ ≤ T − t, the agent’s intra-period continuation payoﬀ is given by
adt (Yt) = λVτ (Yt) + λ(Yt − yL) . (30)
The start-of-period continuation function is obtained as follows:
byt
µ
Yt−1,
1
β
λVτ+1 (Yt−1)
¶
= Et
h
Yt + bdt (Yt, λVτ (Yt) + λ(Yt − yL)) |Yt−1
i
.
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4.4.3 Step Three: Discounting between Periods
So far, we have demonstrated that knowing the end-of-period continuation function bet , one
can obtain the intra-period continuation function bdt , and then the start-of-period continuation
function byt . To complete our recursive characterization of the optimal contract, we derive
the continuation function bet−1 from b
y
t .
With the exception of the payoﬀ discounting, nothing takes place between the end of the
prior period and the beginning of the next period. Hence, if the contract results in the payoﬀ
of aet−1 at the end of period t − 1, then the agent’s payoﬀ at the start of period t must be
aet−1/β. The above argument, combined with the fact that the investor discounts future cash
flows using the same discount factor β, yields the following:
Proposition 6 Given the start-of-period continuation function byt , the continuation function
at the end of period t is given by
bet−1
¡
yt−1, aet−1
¢
= βbyt
µ
yt−1,
aet−1
β
¶
.
4.4.4 Summary of the Algorithm
Propositions 2, 5, 6, and 4, yield the algorithm of computing recursively the functions
bet , b
d
t , b
y
t , and ct starting from the end of the last period T . In general, the functions
bet , b
d
t , b
y
t are too complicated to be written explicitly. However, the evolution of the agent’s
continuation payoﬀ can be described compactly, as is done below:
aet−1 = λVτ (Yt−1) (31)
→ ayt = λVτ (Yt−1) /β (32)
→ adt (Yt) = λVτ−1 (Yt) + λ(Yt − yL) (33)
→ aet = min
³
λVT−t (Yt) , max
³
adt (Yt) , a
L (Yt)
´´
. (34)
During the transition from the end of period t−1 to the beginning of period t, the agent’s
continuation payoﬀ is adjusted by the discount factor β. The transition from ayt to a
d
t (Yt)
provides the agent with an incentive to report the realization of the cash flow Yt truthfully.
Comparing to ayt , the agent’s continuation payoﬀ is going to increase if Yt = yH , and decrease
if Yt = yL:
adt (yL) < a
y
t < a
d
t (yH) .
Transition from adt to a
e
t is characterized by the liquidation probability pt and the transfer
dt.
The evolution of agent’s continuation payoﬀs can be characterized by three regions, as
shown in Figure 5. The project can be liquidated only if the agent’s continuation payoﬀ
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Figure 5: Three regions of the agent’s continuation payoﬀs
adt drops into the liquidation region whose upper boundary is given by a
L (yt) = λV1 (yt).
In the liquidation region, the transfer from the investor to the agent is always zero and the
probability of liquidation is proportional to how much the agent’s continuation payoﬀ is below
the liquidation boundary.
pt
³
adt (yt)
´
= max
µ
aL (yt)− adt (yt)
aL (yt)
, 0
¶
. (35)
In the continuation region, there is no liquidation, but the transfer is also equal to zero.
The agent’s continuation payoﬀ is aﬀected by the realization of Yt in two ways. First, the
current cash flow Yt directly aﬀects the continuation payoﬀ through the term λ(Yt−yL). This
term represents the value of the realized cash flow without taking into account an impact of
this cash flow realization on the subsequent cash flows. Second, the cash flow Yt aﬀects the
agent’s continuation payoﬀ through its impact on the distribution of the future cash flows,
which is reflected in the term λVτ−1 (Yt).
The dividend region is where the first best is implemented. When the agent’s continuation
payoﬀ adt (yt) is above λVT−t (yt), the investor pays to the agent dt = a
d
t (yt)− λVT−t (yt) in
period t. Once the agent’s continuation payoﬀ reaches the dividend region, it always stays
there. The the transfers to the agent in the subsequent periods are given by ds = λ (ys − yL)
for s > t.
As an immediate consequence of the evolution of the agent’s continuation payoﬀ, we have
the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The project is never liquidated in a period in which the high cash flow is reported.
Indeed, at the beginning of a period t, the agent’s continuation payoﬀ must be at least
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aL (yt−1) /β = V1 (yt−1) /β, which is the expected value of the cash flow the agent is able
to steal in this period. After the cash flow yH is reported, his continuation payoﬀ can only
increase. Thus, after a realization of the high cash flow, the agent’s continuation payoﬀ never
goes down into the liquidation zone [0, λV1 (yt)].
The parameter τ can be interpreted as the expected earliest default time. We will refer to τ
simply as the earliest default time. Given the agent’s continuation payoﬀ adt−1 = λVτ t−1 (Yt−1)
in period t− 1, the liquidation will not occur during the next nτ t−1 periods, no matter what
cash flows are reported in these periods. However, if the agent reports the low cash flow
nτ t−1 +1 times in a row, the liquidation will occur in period t+ nτ t−1 with probability lτ t−1 .
To see this, consider the evolution of the agent’s continuation payoﬀs given by (31)-(34). If
the agent reports the low cash flow in period t, his continuation payoﬀ after the report will
be λVτ t−1−1 (yL) if the agent tells the truth and λVτ t−1−1 (yH) if he lies. Thus, the agent’s
continuation payoﬀ will be λVτ t (Yt) in period t, where τ t = τ t−1 − 1. The liquidation will
not occur in period t as long as τ t ≥ 1. Now, one can see that if the agent reports the low
cash flow in period t + 1, his continuation payoﬀ will be λVτ t+1 (Yt), where τ t+1 = τ t − 1.
Thus, the liquidation cannot occur before period t+ nτ t−1 .
4.4.5 Outline of the proof
We are now in a position to prove that if there exists a sequentially optimal contract, then it
must be the contract σ∗ that has been derived using the above algorithm. In this subsection,
we only provide an intuitive explanations for the form of the optimal contract, while the
Appendix contains formal proofs of all the statements made in this section.
Our proof is by induction that starts from the last period T . Assuming that all the
properties of the contract σ∗ outlined above hold in periods t+ 1 through T , we prove that
they must hold in period t to maximize the investor’s expected payoﬀ in this period. In each
period, assuming we know the function bet , we solve the liquidation problem (16)-(19), whose
solution gives us the optimal liquidation probability pt, and the continuation function bdt . The
next step is to solve the intra-period agency problem (22)-(24) and obtain the continuation
function byt . The last step is the transition from the beginning of period t to the end of the
period t− 1, which involves discounting between the periods.
To prove Proposition 2, we need to solve the liquidation problem (16)-(19), in which we
maximize the investor’s continuation payoﬀ bdt
¡
yt, adt
¢
before the liquidation decision, given
continuation function bet . A probabilistic liquidation means that we randomize between the
payoﬀ pair (0, Lt) in the event of liquidation, and the pair (aet , b
e
t (yt, a
e
t )) in the event of con-
tinuation, where the agent’s payoﬀ in the event of continuation is given by aet = a
d
t / (1− pt),
and pt is the probability of liquidation. Let (a˜Lt , b
e
t (yt, a˜
e
t )) denote the payoﬀ point of tan-
gency of a line originating from the point (0, Lt) to the upper frontier of the payoﬀ possibility
set at the end of the period t, given by the function bet . Since the function b
e
t is concave, the
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continuation function bdt is given by the line connecting the points (0, Lt) and (a˜
L
t , b
e
t (yt, a˜
e
t ))
on the interval [0, a˜Lt ] and coincides with b
e
t on (a˜
L
t ,∞). We prove in the Appendix that
a˜Lt = a
L
t (yt). Figure 6 shows the function b
e
t (solid line), which is defined on
£
aL,∞
¤
, and
the function bdt , which is obtained from b
e
t by extending it over the liquidation region
£
0, aL
¤
(dashed line).
Intuitively, we can think about the optimal contracting problem as minimizing the liqui-
dation probabilities while keeping the contract incentive compatible. Due to the ineﬃciency
of liquidation, the investor prefers to threaten the agent with the liquidation in the future
rather than resorting to liquidation immediately. Only when no threat in the future can
induce truth-telling in the current period does the investor liquidate the project.
We now discuss the intra-period agency problem (22)-(25). In each period t, the agent’s
incentives to tell the truth are given through the continuation payoﬀs adt (yt). The agent’s con-
tinuation payoﬀ increases (adt (yH) > a
y
t ) when the high cash flow is reported, and decreases
(adt (yL) < a
y
t ) when the low cash flow is reported. The incentive compatibility constraint
(23) is satisfied only when the diﬀerence between adt (yH) and a
d
t (yL) is wide enough. Accord-
ing to Proposition 3, in order to maximize the investor’s payoﬀ the incentive compatibility
constraints (23) must bind, meaning that the diﬀerence between adt (yH) and a
d
t (yL) is mini-
mized.
To see why the (IC) constraint should bind, consider how the liquidation probability
would be diﬀerent when the (IC) constraint does not bind. The liquidation is likely to occur
sooner after the low cash flow realization than after the high cash flow realization, since the
payoﬀ adt (yL) is closer than the payoﬀ a
d
t (yH) to the liquidation region
¡
0, aL
¢
. Since the
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promise-keeping constraint (24) insures that the mean of adt (yH) and a
d
t (yL) is fixed and is
equal to ayt , relaxing the (IC) constraint leads to a lower payoﬀ a
d
t (yL) after the low cash flow
realization and to a higher payoﬀ adt (yH) after the high cash flow realization, comparing to the
case when the (IC) constraint binds. Thus, relaxing the (IC) constraint leads to even higher
chances of liquidation when liquidation is more likely, and even lower chances of liquidation
when it is less likely. As a result, the expected loss associated with the liquidation increases.
Thus, the (IC) constraint should bind.
4.5 The Optimal Contract without Restrictions
We assumed that Conjecture 1 is true when deriving the contract σ∗. The algorithm employed
to derive the contract σ∗ ensures that if there exists a sequentially optimal contract, it must
be the contract σ∗. However, it may be possible that the optimal contract, i.e. a contract
that maximizes the investor’s payoﬀ at time zero, given the agent’s payoﬀ, is not sequentially
optimal, i.e. it results in suboptimal payoﬀs after some histories. In this case, the contract
σ∗ will remain incentive compatible, but will not maximize the investor’s initial payoﬀ.
In this section, we verify that the contract σ∗ is the optimal contract. We relied on
Conjecture 1 in the formulation of the intra-period agency problem (22)-(24). According
to this problem, the investor maximizes his continuation payoﬀ at the start of period t,
by choosing the agent’s continuation payoﬀs adt (yL) and a
d
t (yH), such that they satisfy the
promise-keeping constraint (PK) and the incentive compatibility constraint (IC). The (IC)
constraint is written using the deviation payoﬀ function ct, which is associated with the
continuation contract σ∗t after yL was reported in period t. We prove that the (IC) constraints
bind for all t ≤ T , and compute function ct recursively.
According to the properties of σ∗, if the agent’s continuation payoﬀ at the start of period
t is given by ayt = λVτ (Yt−1) /β, then his continuation payoﬀ will be a
d
t (Yt) = λVτ−1 (Yt) +
λ(Yt − yL), if he truthfully reports Yt. Hence, the investor’s continuation payoﬀ will be
bdt
¡
Yt, adt (Yt)
¢
, if Yt is realized. We, however, have not considered continuation contracts
that result in payoﬀs below the upper frontiers of the payoﬀ possibility sets, represented
by bdt (Yt, ·). It is not obvious that such contracts are inferior to σ∗, since their incentive
compatibility constraints can be diﬀerent from those associated with the contract σ∗.
The next proposition states the main result of this section.
Proposition 7 σ∗ is the optimal contract.
Proof. See Appendix.
Below, we discuss the main elements of the proof. The contract σ∗ has two important
properties. First, the incentive compatibility constraints always bind. Second, the project can
be liquidated only if the agent’s continuation payoﬀ drops below λV1 (yL), the lowest payoﬀ
value that can be implemented without liquidation. The first property says that the investor
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minimizes the distance between adt (yH) and a
d
t (yL), subject to the (IC) constraint, while
keeping the expectation of adt (Yt) constant. Choosing continuation payoﬀs a˜
d
t (yH) > a
d
t (yH)
and a˜dt (yL) < a
d
t (yL), so that the (PK) holds, would result in lower continuation payoﬀ
for the investor. Choosing continuation payoﬀs a˜dt (yH) < a
d
t (yH) and a˜
d
t (yL) > a
d
t (yL),
so that the (PK) holds, would violate the (IC) constraint. According to Proposition 3, the
incentive compatibility constraints bind for the contract σ∗, which means that if the function
bdt represents the upper frontier of the payoﬀ possibility set (it does if σ
∗ is the optimal
contract), then the investor’s payoﬀ at the beginning of period t is maximized when the
diﬀerence between the agent’s continuation payoﬀs a˜dt (yL) and a˜
d
t (yH) is minimized, subject
to the incentive compatibility and the promise-keeping constraints.
To prove Proposition 7, we start by considering an arbitrary incentive compatible con-
tract σ˜, whose incentive compatibility constraints do not necessarily bind. Let c˜t denote a
deviation payoﬀ function, associated with the contract σ˜. Since, by assumption, σ˜ is incentive
compatible, the agent’s continuation payoﬀs a˜dt , associated with σ˜, must satisfy
a˜dt (yH) ≥ c˜t
³
a˜dt (yL)
´
+ λ (yH − yL) for all t ≤ T. (36)
One can show recursively that equation (36) implies that c˜t (a) ≥ ct (a) for all a ≥ 0, and
t ≤ T .
The function c˜t determines the diﬀerence between a˜dt (yH) and a˜
d
t (yL). The greater the
value of the function c˜t, the greater this diﬀerence is. Since the continuation payoﬀs associated
with the contract σ˜ lie below the upper frontier of the payoﬀ possibility set, σ˜ can be an
improvement on σ∗, only if σ˜ reduces the diﬀerence between the corresponding continuation
payoﬀs for the agent. However, σ˜ never decreases this diﬀerence. Hence, σ˜ cannot be better
than σ∗.
4.6 Initiating the Contract
The contract is initiated at time zero. The initial state Y0 of the Markov cash flows and the
continuation payoﬀ ae0 (Y0) for the agent uniquely determine the optimal contract between
the agent and the investor. Thus, when Y0 is commonly known, initiating the contract means
choosing the payoﬀs ae0 (Y0) and b
e
0 (yL, a
e
0 (yL)) for the agent and for the investor, respectively.
The situation is not much diﬀerent when the initial state Y0 is unknown but its distribution
is the common knowledge. Suppose, Y0 is unknown, but both the agent and the investor assess
that Pr(Y0 = yH) = qH .
Proposition 8 If the optimal contract σ∗ implements payoﬀs ae0 (Y0), and b
e
0 (Y0, a
e
0 (Y0)),
when the state Y0 is known, then, when Y0 is unknown, σ∗ is also optimal and implements
payoﬀs a0 = E [ae0 (Y0)], and b0 (a0) = E [b
e
0 (Y0, a
e
0 (Y0))].
Proof. See Appendix.
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In the proof of Proposition 8, we use the fact that the contract σ∗ remains optimal in
both states.
The contract sets initial continuation payoﬀs for the agent and the investor. Which pair
of payoﬀs is chosen depends on the competitive environment. If the agent is a monopolist
facing a competitive row of investors, he chooses the initial continuation payoﬀ aA0 , so that
the investor is break-even:
aA0 = sup {a : b0 (a) ≥ I −W} .
Proposition 9 In the setting with a monopolistic agent and competitive investors, it is op-
timal for the agent to invest all his wealth in the project at date 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
On the other hand, if the investor has all the market power, she chooses to maximize her
payoﬀ:
aI0 = argmaxa
b0 (a) .
In general, the initial payoﬀ a0 for the agent can be anything between aI0 and a
A
0 depending
on the market power of the agent and the investor, with a0 increasing with the agent’s market
power and decreasing with the investor’s market power.
5 The Implementation Result
So far we have characterized the optimal contract in terms of the transfers between the agent
and the investors, and the probabilities of liquidation of the project. In this section, we show
that the optimal contract can be implemented using a credit line with performance pricing,
equity and a coupon bond. We define these securities as follows:
Coupon Bond. A coupon bond represents the agent’s commitment to make a coupon
payments x to the investor at the end of each period t ≤ T . If the agent is unable to make
the coupon payment, the firm is in default.
Credit Line with Performance Pricing. A credit line is characterized by a credit
limit CLt and an interest rate r
C
t (Mt−1) charged on the balance Mt−1 on the credit line.
Note that we allow the interest rate to be a function of the credit line balance. The interest
payment on the outstanding balance is due at the end of each period. The credit limit CLt
determines the maximum amount of credit available for the agent in period t. Inability to
make the current interest payment without exceeding the credit line limit leads to default.
In addition, the credit line can have an initiation fee and restrictions on the dividend policy,
which we will discuss later.
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Equity. The agent is allowed to use cash flows to pay dividends to the equity holders in
proportion to their share of ownership.
Default occurs when the agent is unable to fulfil his financial obligations. Default leads
to a probabilistic liquidation. Given an unmade payment zt, the firm is liquidated with prob-
ability pt (zt), while with probability (1− pt (zt)), the investor forgives the unmade payment
zt, and lets the agent operate the firm in the next period6. In the even of liquidation, the
investor sells the firm’s assets and pockets the liquidation value L t , while the agent gets
nothing.
Theorem 2 The optimal contract can be implemented by a combination of equity, a coupon
bond, and a credit line with an escalating interest rate. The agent holds fraction λ of the
equity, while the rest is held by the investor. The bond’s coupon is equal to the verifiable cash
flow:
x = yL.
The credit line has a credit limit given by
CLt = VT−t (yH)− V1 (yH) for t < T, (37)
and an interest rate rCt that depends on the credit line balance as follows:
Let the balance Mt−1 on the credit line at the end of period t− 1 be represented as a function
of parameter τ :
Mt−1 (τ) = VT−t (yH)− Vτ (yH)). (38)
Then, the interest rate charged on this balance is given by
rCt (Mt−1 (τ)) =
VT−t (yH)− Vτ−1 (yH)
VT−t+1 (yH)− Vτ (yH)
− 1. (39)
The agent can draw on the credit line to make interest payments. However, he is not allowed
to borrow from the credit line to pay dividends.
In the event of default, the unmade payment zt results in the probability of liquidation
pt (zt) =
zt
V1 (yH)
. (40)
With probability (1− pt (zt)), the project is not liquidated, and the unmade payment zt is
forgiven.
Proof. : See Appendix.
6Although our definition of default is non-standard, it is consistent with the fact that creditors are often
willing to write oﬀ a part of the debt instead of forcing bankruptcy. We can interpret the probabilistic
liquidation as an uncertainty associated with the default procedure, which we do not model here.
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Figure 7: Agent’s continuation payoﬀ and credit line balance
In the optimal combination of securities, the roles of the coupon debt and equity are
straightforward. The coupon debt is used to extract the verifiable cash flow yL, while divi-
dends paid to the equity holders represent a reward to the agent for repaying the credit line
debt. Given his stake λ in the firm’s equity, the agent is indiﬀerent between stealing cash
flows and issuing the dividends. The role of the credit line with an escalating interest rate
is more sophisticated. The balance on the credit line can be considered as a memory device
that summarizes all the relevant information regarding the past cash flow realizations. The
interest rate along with the credit limit determines the dynamics of the credit line balance
and the timing of the default. The threat of losing control over the project induces the agent
to pay the credit line.
To prove Theorem 2, we show that the evolution of the balance on the credit line reflects
the evolution of the agent’s continuation payoﬀs induced by the contract σ∗. Specifically,
the parameters of the credit line are chosen so that the available credit is proportional to
the agent’s continuation payoﬀ in the high state under the optimal contract σ∗ minus the
liquidation boundary λV1 (yH):
CLt −Mt =
³
adt (yH)− λV1 (yH)
´
/λ. (41)
As Figure 7 illustrates, zero balance on the credit line corresponds to the dividend threshold
λVT−t (yH), while the balance equal to the credit limit corresponds to the liquidation thresh-
old λV1 (yH). An increase in the balance leads to a lower continuation payoﬀ. Default occurs
when the balance exceeds the credit limit.
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The agent uses all excess cash flows (Yt − yL) to pay the credit line. Given the outstanding
balance Mt−1 in period t − 1 and the payment (Yt − yL) by the agent in period t, the new
balance becomes
Mt = (1 + r
C
t (Mt−1))Mt−1 − (Yt − yL) .
When a cash flow is low, the agent has to draw on the credit line to make the interest payment,
as long as his outstanding balance stays within the credit limit. On the other hand, the high
cash flow leads to a reduction of the balance. The interest rate rCt (Mt−1) is chosen so that
the evolution of the balance Mt is consistent with the evolution of the agent’s continuation
payoﬀs in the high state under the contract σ∗.
Since the balance on the credit line tracks the agent’s continuation payoﬀ in the high
state, the agent has no incentive to divert excess cash flows. In the low state, there is no
excess cash flow to divert. However, the credit limit in the low state is too generous compared
to the agent’s continuation payoﬀ. If allowed, the agent would draw the credit line up to the
limit, use all the borrowed cash to issue dividends and declare bankruptcy afterwards. To
avoid this scenario, the credit line has the covenant that does not allow the agent to draw on
the credit line to pay dividends.
5.1 The Optimal Interest Rate Structure
We now examine properties of the optimal interest rate structure. The dependence of the
interest rate rCt on the balance Mt−1 is expressed through the parameter τ . Equations (38)
and (39) should be read as follows: First, for a given balance Mt−1, we find τ that solves
equation (38). Then, we substitute τ into equation (39) that gives us the interest rate
rCt (Mt−1) charged on the balance.
It is more convenient to examine the interest rate structure in the stationary setting with
T →∞. Let
V∞ (y) ≡ E
" ∞X
k=1
βk (Yk − yL) |Y0 = y
#
.
We can omit the time index and simplify equations (38) and (39) that become
Mτ = V∞ (yH)− Vτ (yH)), (42)
and
rC (Mτ ) =
Vτ (yH)− Vτ−1 (yH)
Mτ
. (43)
We start our analysis of the optimal interest rate structure with two benchmark cases:
independent cash flows and perfectly correlated cash flows.
Theorem 3 When the cash flows are independent over time (Q (yL) = Q (yH)) or perfectly
correlated (Q (yL) = 0, Q (yH) = 1), the optimal interest rate is equal to the risk free interest
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rate: rC (M) = r.
Proof. For ease of presentation, we prove the statement of Theorem 3 only for the case
when the earliest default time τ is an integer. The reader can verify that the statement of
Theorem 3 holds for any real τ .
For the earliest default times τ¯ = 1, 2, 3..., equations (42) and (43) can be further simpli-
fied. In particular, the interest rate rC can be represented as7
rC (Mτ¯ ) = β
τ¯ E [(Yτ¯ − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
Mτ¯
, (44)
where, the balance Mτ¯ on the credit line is equal to a time zero value of the excess cash flows
that will be generated after date τ¯ :
Mτ¯ = βτ¯
∞X
k=1
βkE[(Yτ¯+k − yL) |Y0 = yH ]. (45)
When the cash flows are either independent or perfectly correlated, the conditional expecta-
tions of future excess cash flows are equal to the unconditional expectation:
E[(Yτ¯+k − yL) |Y0 = yH ] ≡ Q (yH) (yH − yL) .
Let µ ≡ Q (yH) (yH − yL). Then,
Mτ¯ = βτ¯
∞X
k=1
βkµ = β τ¯
β
1− βµ. (46)
Substituting, (46) into (44) gives
rC (Mτ¯ ) =
1− β
β
= r.
Theorem 3 replicates the result by DeMarzo and Fishman (2003) who consider indepen-
dent cash flows. The reason the optimal interest rate is constant when the cash flows are
i.i.d. is that the expectation of the future cash flows is constant.
The correlation of the cash flows introduces a link between the current cash flow and
the future cash flows. This link becomes weaker as the time separating the current and
future cash flows increases. This means that E [(Yτ¯ − yL) |Y0 = yH ], the numerator in (44),
7When the earliest default time τ is not an integer, the optimal interest rate is given by
rC (Mτ ) = β
nτ (1− lτ )E [(Ynτ − yL) |Y0 = yH ] + lτE [β (Ynτ+1 − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
Mτ
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is decreasing8 with τ¯ . Although Mτ¯/βτ¯ also depends on τ¯ , the overall eﬀect on the interest
rate rC is that rC is decreasing with τ¯ , which means that rC is increasing with the balance
on the credit line:
Theorem 4 The interest rate rC charged on the credit line is increasing with the outstanding
balance M . Moreover
lim
M→0
rC (M) = r,
and
rC
¡
CL
¢
≤ rQ (yH)
Q (yL)
(1− (Q (yH)−Q (yL))) . (47)
Proof. Consider the case when the earliest default time is an integer. According to (44)
and (45), the interest rate on the credit line is given by
rC (Mτ¯ ) = β
τ¯ E [(Yτ¯ − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
βτ¯
∞P
k=1
βkE[(Yτ¯+k − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
=
Ã ∞X
k=1
βk
E[(Yτ¯+k − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
E [(Yτ¯ − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
!−1
, (48)
for the earliest default time τ¯ = 1, 2, 3...
According to Lemma 5(iii) in Appendix,
E[(Yτ¯+k − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
E [(Yτ¯ − yL) |Y0 = yH ] ≤
E[(Yτ¯+1+k − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
E [(Yτ¯+1 − yL) |Y0 = yH ] .
The last inequality means that if we increase the earliest default time by one, then every term
in the sum in (48) will become bigger, and the interest rate will therefore become smaller.
The higher the earliest default time τ¯ , the smaller the balanceMτ¯ on the credit line is. Thus,
the interest rate charged on the credit line increases with the balance on the credit line, for
the earliest default time taking integer values. One can verify that this result holds for any
earliest default time.
When τ¯ →∞, Mτ¯ → 0. The cash flow process is asymptotically stationary. As a result,
lim
τ¯→∞
E[(Yτ¯+k − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
E [(Yτ¯ − yL) |Y0 = yH ] = 1.
8See Lemma 5 in Appendix.
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Using (48),
lim
M→0
rC (M) =
Ã ∞X
k=1
βk
!−1
=
1− β
β
= r.
The interest rate charged on the credit line is the highest when the balance on the credit
line reaches the credit limit, at which point the earliest default time τ = 1. Using (48) the
fact9 that
E[(Yk − yL) |Y0 = yH ] ≥ lim
s→∞
E[(Ys − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
=
Q (yL)
1− (Q (yH)−Q (yL))
(yH − yL),
we can write that
rC (M1) ≤
E [(Y1 − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
∞P
k=1
βk
Q (yL)
1− (Q (yH)−Q (yL))
(yH − yL)
=
1− β
β
Q (yH)
Q (yL)
(1− (Q (yH)−Q (yL)))
= r
Q (yH)
Q (yL)
(1− (Q (yH)−Q (yL))) .
Theorem 4 says that the optimal interest rate schedule starts with the risk-free interest
rate at the zero balance and monotonically increases with the balance. The interest rate,
however, never goes above the boundary, given by (47). When cash flows are independent
over time or perfectly correlated, the optimal interest rate is equal to the risk free interest
rate. Thus, the correlation of the cash flows explains the fact that the optimal interest rate
is increasing with the balance.
In order to understand the optimal interest rate structure, it is useful to reexamine the
properties of the optimal contract. Under the optimal contract, the agent is always indiﬀerent
between using excess cash flows to pay down the credit line or diverting them for his own
consumption. On the equilibrium path, the agent who holds fraction λ of the equity uses
excess cash flows to pay oﬀ the credit line first and then to issue dividends. His continuation
payoﬀ in equilibrium is thus equal to the expected value of his share of the future dividends.
Instead of paying down the credit line, the agent, however, can get the same continuation
payoﬀ by diverting all the future excess cash flows until he exhausts the credit line, at
9See Lemma 5(iv) in Appendix.
37
which point he defaults. The optimal interest rate minimizes expected costs of default, while
discouraging cash flow diversion by the agent. Holding the credit limit constant, an interest
rate schedule, which lies below the optimal schedule, would not be incentive competitive. On
the other hand, an interest rate schedule, which lies above the optimal schedule, would result
in unnecessary high chances of default.
After diverting an excess cash flow, the agent is in a better position when the cash flows
are positively correlated, than when they are independent over time. Indeed, subsequent cash
flows are more likely to be high, given the high cash flow in the current period. Hence, given
the same time interval, the agent is capable of stealing on average more cash when the cash
flows are positively correlated. Under the optimal contract, a higher interest rate charged on
the credit line precipitates default and discourages the agent from stealing cash flows.
The optimal interest rate structure reflects an average rate at which the agent can divert
the cash flows. When the cash flows are positively correlated, the expectation of a future
cash flow depends on the current cash flow as well as the time between the current date and
the date of the future cash flow realization. Figure 8 presents an example of the expected
amount of cash the agent can divert if he starts diverting cash flows in the high state. One
can see that because the cash flows are positively correlated the expected value of the cash
flows decreases as the times goes on. This fact has an important implication for the agent’s
willingness to divert the cash flows. The higher balance on the credit line, the shorter time
interval during which the agent can divert the cash flows. However, as Figure 8 illustrates,
the amount of cash that the agent can divert per period is higher, the shorter the time interval
during which the diversion takes place. Thus, the agent has a stronger motive to divert cash
flows when the balance is high. In order to prevent stealing, the time interval during which
the agent is allowed to run the project when he reports the low cash flow in each period
should be shorten. Under the optimal contract, this is done by charging higher interest rate
at the end of the credit line.
When deriving the optimal contract, we assumed that the agent is not allowed to save
and therefore cannot overreport cash flows. Given the result of Theorem 4, it is easy to see
that optimal contract remains incentive compatible even when the agent is allowed to save.
The interest rate rC charged on the balance on the credit line is higher than the rate ρ, at
which the agent’s savings grow. Therefore, if the agent diverts the high cash flow today,
saves it privately and and then uses the savings to pay down the credit line in the future,
the resulting balance on the credit line will be higher than when he uses all the cash flows to
pay down the credit line immediately. Thus, the agent has no incentives to save under the
optimal contract.
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Figure 8: Expectation of future cash flows, given the high cash flow in period 1, E[Yt|Y1 = yH ],
for parameters yL = 0, yH = 1, Q (yL) = 0.15, Q (yH) = 0.85
5.1.1 An Example
Now, we illustrate how the optimal interest rate schedule changes with the degree of the cash
flow correlation. Consider a stationary case with the risk-free interest rate 5% (r = 0.05),
and symmetric transition probabilities: Q (yH) = q and Q (yL) = 1 − q, where q ∈ [0.5, 1].
Higher q means stronger correlation. When q = 0.5, the cash flows are independent over
time. When q = 1, the cash flows are perfectly correlated.
As illustrated in Figure 9, the interest rate rC on the credit line is equal to the risk-free
interest rate when q = 0.5 for any size of the outstanding balance M . When q is increased
to 0.6, the optimal interest rate rC lies above the risk free rate r. However, the diﬀerence
between rC and r remains insignificant as long as the balance on the credit line stays below
86% of the credit limit. The interest rate grows sharply once the balance becomes greater
than 86 percentage points of the credit limit, and almost reaches 6% when the credit line
is completely exhausted. A greater degree of the cash flow correlation causes the interest
rate to escalate earlier. For q = 0.85, the interest rate rC becomes visibly greater than r
when the balance crosses the 40% mark. Afterwards, rC keeps growing and reaches 7.9% in
the end. When the cash flows are extremely correlated (q = 0.995), the interest rate jumps
sharply at the beginning and remains relatively flat afterwards, staying just below 0.055. In
the deterministic limit (q = 1), the interest rate remains identically equal to the risk-free
interest rate, as was the case with the independent cash flows.
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Figure 9: The optimal interest rate structure.
5.2 The Market Values of the Securities
The continuation payoﬀs for the agent and the investor given by adt (yt) and b
d
t
¡
yt, adt (yt)
¢
can be used to determine market values of the securities used in the implementation of the
optimal contract. For ease of presentation we again consider stationary setting with T =∞.
We will refer to the combination of the bond and the credit line balance as debt. Let D (y,M)
and S (y,M) denote the market value of the debt and the equity, given the state y and the
balance M on the credit line. Since the agent owns the fraction λ of the equity and has no
other securities, the agent’s continuation payoﬀ is given by
adt (yt) = λS (yt,Mt) .
Equation (41) connects the agent’s continuation payoﬀ in the high state to the balance on
the credit line. We can rewrite (41) as follows
adt (yH) = λ
¡
CL −Mt + V1 (yH)
¢
.
Thus, the value of the equity in the high state is given by
S (yH ,Mt) = C
L
t −Mt + V1 (yH) . (49)
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The agent’s continuation payoﬀ in the low state that corresponds to the same earliest default
time and hence to the same balance on the credit line is adt (yL) = c
−1 ¡adt (yH)¢. Hence, the
equity value in the low state is given by
S (yL,Mt) =
1
λ
c−1
¡
λ
¡
CLt −Mt + V1 (yH)
¢¢
. (50)
Note that while S (yH ,Mt) is linear in Mt, S (yL,Mt) is convex in Mt.
The investor’s continuation payoﬀ bd
¡
yt, adt (yt)
¢
consists of the value of the debt plus the
value of the fraction (1− λ) of the equity. Thus, the value of the debt in the high state is
given by
D (yH ,Mt) = b
d ¡yH , λ ¡CL −Mt + V1 (yH)¢¢− (1− λ) ¡CL −Mt + V1 (yH)¢ , (51)
and the value of the debt in the low state is given by
D (yL,Mt) = b
d ¡yL, c−1 ¡λ ¡CL −Mt + V1 (yH)¢¢¢− (1− λ)λ c−1 ¡λ(CL −Mt + V1 (yH))¢ .
Zero balance on the credit line corresponds to the first best. Once the first best is reached
the low cash flows are paid to the investor as the bond’s coupon payments, while the excess
cash flows are used to pay dividends to the equity holders. The value of the debt in this
situation is equal to the value of the future low cash flows:
D (yt, 0) =
βyL
1− β .
Assuming that the bond is risk-free10, D (yt, 0) is the nominal as well as the market value of
the bond. Diﬀerentiating (51) with respect to Mt gives
∂D (yH ,Mt)
∂Mt
= 1− λ
Ã
1 +
∂bd
¡
yH , λ
¡
CL −Mt + V1 (yH)
¢¢
∂adt
!
≤ 1. (52)
The inequality follows from the fact that the derivative of the value function bd is greater
than or equal to -1. This leads us to the following theorem:
Theorem 5 The market value of the credit line debt is below its nominal value.
For the high state, the result of Theorem 5 follows from (52). For the low state, the result
of Theorem 5 follows from the fact that the value of debt in the low state is below that in
the high state.
10Since the liquidation value of the project is greater or equal than βyL
1−β , the bond is risk free if it has
seniority over the credit line. The seniority however does not matter since the investor holds both the bond
and the credit line. So, we can assume without loss of generality that the bond is risk free.
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Figure 10: Values of securities.
Theorem 5 implies that although the interest rate on the credit line increases as the
balance on the credit line goes up, it is not enough to compensate the investor for the higher
risk. Thus, the prediction of the agency theory of performance pricing developed in this
paper is in contrast to the theory that says that performance pricing is used to compensate
investors for higher risks in times of poor performance. This prediction opens room for an
empirical test of the theories. Another empirically testable implication of Theorem 5 is that
in order to break-even the investor must charge an additional fee for activating the credit
line. In our setting, this means that the initial balance on the credit line is greater than the
amount of money the agent actually borrows from the credit line at time zero.
Figure 10 plots the values of the equity and the credit line debt for the following para-
meters: yL = 0, yH = 1, r = 0.05, Q (yH) = q = 0.85, Q (yL) = 1− q, λ = 1, α = 0.5. Given
these parameters, there is no bond, the agent holds 100% of the equity, and the debt value
is equal to the value of the balance on the credit line. As Theorem 5 predicts the values of
the credit line debt in both states lie below the 45 degree line.
Since the value of the debt in the low state is downward sloping when the balance is close
to the credit limit, the contract is not renegotiation proof. By writing oﬀ a part of the credit
line debt, the investor can increase the continuation payoﬀs for himself and for the agent.
A possibility of such renegotiation would destroy the agent’s incentives to pay oﬀ the credit
line. Thus, the full commitment to the terms of the contract is crucial in this example. It
is not always the case that the contract is not renegotiation proof. An important parameter
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Figure 11: Renegotiation proof contract
for the renegotiation proofness is the liquidation value of the project. The example in Figure
10 has α = 0.5. As Figure 11 shows, the optimal contract becomes renegotiation proof when
α = 0.9.
6 The Continuous Time Model
In this section we take a continuous time limit of our discrete time model. We do it by
decreasing the length of each period to zero and adjusting the transition probabilities at the
same time. We then characterize the optimal contract in continuous time. Unlike the discrete
time setting, the optimal interest rate in the continuous time setting is given by a smooth
function, the continuation functions can be easily obtained by solving a pair of diﬀerential
equations, and the optimal liquidation policy is deterministic.
6.1 The Continuous Time Setting
In this section, we consider the stationary setting, i.e. T →∞. Letting ∆ denote the length
of one period, the discount factor between periods is given by β = e−r∆, where r is the risk-
free interest rate. For ease of presentation, we normalize the low cash flow per unit of time to
zero, yL = 0, and the high cash flow to one, yH = 1. The cash flow in period t is proportional
to the length of the period and is given by ∆Yt, where Yt ∈ {0, 1}. In addition, we assume
that the cash flows follow a symmetric Markov process, with the transition probabilities given
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by Q (yH) = q and Q (yL) = 1− q, where
q = e−γ∆.
The probability q that the cash flow remains the same as in the previous period is adjusted
to reflect the length of the period. In the limit, as ∆→ 0, the discrete time Markov chain be-
comes a continuous time switching process with the parameter γ ∈ [0,∞) being the intensity
of switching from one state to another. Indeed, since q = e−γ∆ ≈ 1− γ∆,
γ = lim
∆→0
1− q
∆
.
Higher γ means higher intensity of switching, or smaller degree of the correlation. The cash
flows are perfectly correlated when γ = 0, and become independent over time when γ → +∞.
Figure 12 shows a possible cash flow path in continuous time. The initial cash flow is
high. At time t1, the cash flow switches to the low state, where it stays until time t2. Then,
it switches back to the high state, and then switches again to the low state at time t3.
6.2 Characterization of the Optimal Continuous Contract
Since the evolution of the agent’s continuation payoﬀs under the optimal contract is charac-
terized by (31)-(34) in terms of the evolution of the earliest default time, we start our analysis
with examining properties of the continuous time version of the functions Vτ . The expected
present value of the cash flows that the project will generate during the time interval [t, t+ τ ]
is given by E
hPτ/∆
k=1 e
−r∆k∆Yt+k|Yt = y
i
, where τ/∆ is approximately equal to the number
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of periods in the interval [t, t+ τ ]. Although τ/∆ may not be a whole number, the remainder
does not matter in the limit. Thus, we define V˜τ in the continuous time setting as follows:
V˜τ (y) ≡ lim
∆→0
E
⎡
⎣
τ/∆X
k=1
e−r∆k∆Yt+k|Yt = y
⎤
⎦ .
Lemma 4 The expected present value of the cash flows that the project generates during the
time τ is given by
V˜τ (y) =
1− e−rτ
2r
+ (2y − 1) 1− e
−(2γ+r)τ
2 (2γ + r)
. (53)
The proof is given in the appendix.
The first term in (53) is independent of the initial state y and is equal to the expected
present value of the cash flows that the project generates during the time τ when cash flows
are independent over time, i.e., γ = +∞. The second term is positive when the initial state
is high, and negative when the initial state is low. The value of the project that operates
indefinitely long is denoted by
V˜∞ (y) ≡
1
2r
+ (2y − 1) 1
2 (2γ + r)
.
V˜∞ (y) is the dividend boundary. The agent gets paid under the optimal contract only when
his continuation payoﬀ exceeds the dividend boundary.
Since the continuation functions now are no longer dependent on time in the stationary
setting, we can suppress the time subscript. We can also get rid of superscripts and consider
a single continuation function instead of the three diﬀerent continuation functions byt , b
d
t , b
e
t
that we had in the discrete time model for each period. Since the agent’s payoﬀs under an
optimal continuation contract depend on the current state, but can be characterized in terms
of the earliest default time τ , which does not depend on the current state, it is convenient to
express the continuation payoﬀ for the investor as a function of the earliest default time τ .
We define
bL (τ) ≡ lim
∆→0
bd (yL, λVτ (yL))
bH (τ) ≡ lim
∆→0
bd (yH , λVτ (yH))
An advantage of having the earliest default time τ , instead of the agent’s continuation payoﬀ a,
as the argument of the continuation functions bL and bH is that the agent’s continuation payoﬀ
jumps every time the cash flow changes, while the earliest default time does not. Because
of the continuity of the earliest default time process, we can characterize the continuation
functions bL and bH using a pair of diﬀerential equations. Let b0L and b
0
H denote the derivatives
of the continuation functions in continuous time.
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Proposition 10 In the continuous time setting, the liquidation boundary aL (y) = 0. The
earliest default time evolves as follows
dτ =
µ
−1 + 2Yt
e−rτ + e−(2γ+r)τ
¶
dt (54)
The continuation functions bL and bH solve the pair of the following diﬀerential equations:
rbL (τ) = γ (bH (τ)− bL (τ))− b0L (τ) (55)
rbH (τ) = 1− γ (bH (τ)− bL (τ)) +
2− e−rτ − e−(2γ+r)τ
e−rτ + e−(2γ+r)τ
b0H (τ) (56)
Moreover,
lim
τ→∞
bL (τ) = (1− λ) V˜∞ (yL) (57)
lim
τ→∞
bH (τ) = (1− λ) V˜∞ (yH) (58)
lim
τ→0
bL (τ) = αV˜∞ (yL) (59)
Proof. The default boundary in the discrete time setting is given by aL (y) = λE [∆Yt+1|Yt = y].
As ∆→ 0, aL (y)→ 0.
In discrete time, if the agent’s continuation payoﬀ at time t is equal to λVτ (Yt), his
continuation payoﬀ at time t+∆, according to (31)-(34), is given by Vτ+dτ = λVτ−∆ (Yt+∆)+
λ∆Yt+∆, where dτ denotes the increment of the earliest default time. Using the Taylor
expansion, we obtain
dτ =
Ã
−1 + Yt+∆
∂Vτ (Yt+∆)
∂τ
!
∆.
Since ∂V˜τ (Yt)∂τ = 0.5
¡
e−rτ + (2Yt − 1) e−(2γ+r)τ
¢
, taking the limit and replacing ∆ by dt yields
(54).
The probability that Yt+∆ = yL is equal to e−γ∆. Letting bd denote the middle-of-period
continuation function in the discrete time setting, we can write
bd (yL, λVτ (yL)) = e
−r∆
³¡
1− e−γ∆
¢
(∆+ bd (yH , λVτ−∆ (yH) + λ∆))
´
+e−r∆e−γ∆bd (yL, λVτ−∆ (yL)) .
Using Taylor expansions, we obtain
bd (yL, λVτ (yL)) ≈ (1− r∆) (γ∆(∆+ bd (yH , λVτ−∆ (yH) + λ∆))
+ (1− γ∆) bd (yL, λVτ−∆ (yL))). (60)
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Collecting the terms in (60) and ignoring those that are of order ∆2 or smaller yields
bd (yL, λVτ (yL))− bd (yL, λVτ−∆ (yL))
∆
≈ γ
³
bd (yH , λVτ−∆ (yH) + λ∆))− bd (yL, λVτ−∆ (yL))
´
(61)
−γrbd (yL, λVτ−∆ (yL)) .
As ∆→ 0, (61) becomes (55).
Now, we consider the case with the high initial state. Similarly to (??), we can write
bd (yH , λVτ (yH)) = e
−r∆e−γ∆(∆+ bd (yH , λVτ−∆ (yH) + λ∆)) (62)
+e−r∆(1− e−γ∆)bd (yL, λVτ−∆ (yL)) .
Using the Taylor expansion and rearranging terms yields
bd (yH , λVτ−∆ (yH) + λ∆)− bd (yH , λVτ (yH))
∆
≈ −1 + rbd (yH , λVτ−∆ (yH)) (63)
+γ
³
bd (yH , λVτ−∆ (yH) + λ∆))− bd (yL, λVτ−∆ (yL))
´
.
Taking the limit of the left-hand-side of (63) gives
lim
∆→0
bd (yH , λVτ−∆ (yH) + λ∆)− bd (yH , λVτ (yH))
∆
= lim
∆→0
∂bd (yH , λVτ−∆ (yH) + λ∆)
∂a
λ
µ
1− Vτ (yH)− Vτ−∆ (yH)
∆
¶
=
∂bd
³
yH , λV˜τ (yH)
´
∂a
λ
Ã
1− ∂V˜τ (yH)
∂τ
!
=
b0H (τ)
λ∂V˜τ (yH)∂τ
λ
Ã
1− ∂V˜τ (yH)
∂τ
!
= b0H (τ)
⎛
⎝
Ã
∂V˜τ (yH)
∂τ
!−1
− 1
⎞
⎠
= b0H (τ)
µ
2
e−rτ + e−(2γ+r)
− 1
¶
= b0H (τ)
2− e−rτ − e−(2γ+r)
e−rτ + e−(2γ+r)
(64)
Here, we used the Taylor expansion for the function bd, and then applied the formula for the
derivative of a composite function to
∂bd(yH ,λV˜τ (yH))
∂a . Taking the limit of the right-hand-side
of (63) and substituting (64) into (63) yields (56).
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Figure 13: Continuation functions in continuous time.
When the agent’s continuation payoﬀ reaches the dividend boundary V∞ (yt), the first
best is implemented as follows. The agent consumes the fraction λ of all subsequent cash
flows, while the investor gets the fraction (1− λ) of the subsequent cash flows. Hence
bd (λV∞ (yt)) = (1− λ)V∞ (yt) . (65)
As ∆ → 0, (65) yields (57) and (58). Condition (59) follows from the fact that liquidation
value of the project in the low state is given by αV˜∞ (yL).
We interpret equations (55) and (56) as follows. In order to get b, the investor must earn
total return rb. Equation (55) says that in the low state the return is equal to the expected
benefits from switching to the high state, γ (bH (τ)− bL (τ)), less the derivative, b0L (τ), which
reflects the fact that reporting the low cash flow is penalized by reducing the earliest default
time. Equation (56) says that the return in the high state is equal to the high cash flow,
1, less the expected loss from switching to the low state, γ (bH (τ)− bL (τ)), plus the term
2−e−rτ−e−(2γ+r)τ
e−rτ+e−(2γ+r)τ
b0H (τ) that reflects an increase in the earliest default time when the high
cash flow is reported. Proposition 10 also establishes that the optimal liquidation policy is
no longer stochastic. Default happens exactly when the agent’s continuation payoﬀ reaches
zero.
We can use diﬀerential equations (55) and (56) to calculate the continuation functions
b (y, a). We first solve the equations for bL (τ) and bH (τ), and then for each τ , we compute
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the corresponding payoﬀ a = Vτ (y) for the agent. Figure 13 depicts the investor’s payoﬀ as
a function of the agent’s payoﬀ in the low and high states for the parameters r = 0.05, γ =
0.1, λ = 1, α = 0. Note, that although the liquidation value of the project is zero in both
states, lima→0 b (yH , a) > 0. This is because of the persistency of the cash flow process.
6.3 The Implementation of the Optimal Continuous Time Contract
In the discrete time setting, we have shown that the optimal contract can be implemented
using an equity and a credit line with performance pricing. The investor who owns the fraction
(1− λ) of the equity opens the credit line to the agent who is the owner of the remaining
shares of the firm. The credit line is characterized by the credit limit CL = V∞ (yH)−V1 (yH)
and the interest rate that increases with the balance. We now characterize the implementation
of the optimal contract in the continuous time setting.
Theorem 6 The optimal contract in the continuous time setting can be implemented using a
combination of equity and a credit line with performance pricing. The agent holds the fraction
λ of the equity, while the investor holds the remaining (1− λ). The credit line has the credit
limit
C˜L =
1
2r
+
1
2 (2γ + r)
. (66)
The earliest default time τ corresponds to the following balance on the credit line:
M (τ) =
e−rτ
2r
+
e−(2γ+r)τ
2 (2γ + r)
. (67)
The interest rate charged on the balance M (τ) is given by
r˜C (M(τ)) =
1 + e−2γτ
1
r +
e−2γτ
2γ+r
. (68)
Proof. The parameter λ is not aﬀected when we reduce the length ∆ of a period. So,
the optimal shares of the firm’s equity held by the agent and the investor are the same as in
discrete time.
The credit limit in the discrete time is equal to the first best value V∞ (yH) of the project
in the high state less the expected present value of the next period cash flows V1 (yH). As
∆→ 0, V1 (yH)→ 0, and V∞ (yH)→ V˜∞ (y) ≡ 12r +
1
2(2γ+r) , which proves (66).
Theorem 2 in discrete time says that for the balance
M (τ) = V∞ (yH)− Vτ (yH) ,
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Figure 14: Creditl limit C˜L as a function of γ.
the interest rate on the credit line is given by
rC (M (τ)) =
Vτ (yH)− Vτ−1 (yH)
Mτ
.
Replacing V∞ (yH) and Vτ (yH) with V˜∞ (yH) and V˜τ (yH) yields (67) and (68).
One can verify that equation (68) is equivalent to
r˜C (M(τ))M (τ) =
Vτ (yH)
∂τ
. (69)
The intuition behind (69) is as follows. If the agent makes the interest payment r˜C (M(τ))M(τ),
the balance on the credit line does not change. It buys the agent an extra time to default,
which provides an opportunity to steal more cash flows in the future. The expected present
value of the additional cash flows the agent can steal is equal to Vτ (yH)∂τ . Equation (69) follows
from the fact that under the optimal contract, the agent is indiﬀerent between stealing and
paying oﬀ the credit line.
Since the credit limit and interest rate are characterized by the smooth functions (66) -
(68), it makes it easier to analyze the properties of the credit line in continuous time. The
credit limit C˜L decreases in both the risk-free interprets rate r and the intensity γ. This is
because the credit limit is equal to the first best value of the project in the high state. An
increase in the interest rate leads to a lower expected present value of the future cash flows.
An increase in γ leads to higher chances of switching from the high to the low state, which
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Figure 15: Earliest default time τ as a function of the balance M on the credit line.
decreases the first best value of the project in the high state. For a given r, the smallest credit
limit is equal to 12r , which is achieved when γ → ∞. When γ is high, the cash flow process
switches between 0 and 1 so frequently that the average cash flow is 0.5, no matter what the
time zero state was. Hence, the first best value of the project is 12r . On the other hand, for
a small γ, switching from 1 to 0 is highly unlikely. As γ → 0, the credit limit reaches its
highest value 1r . Thus, the highest possible credit limit is twice as high as the smallest one.
Figure 14 shows how the credit limit changes with γ when r = 0.05.
Equation (67) relates the balance M on the credit line to the earliest default time τ .
Given the current balance, the earliest default time τ corresponds to the default time in
the case the agent always reports zero cash flows. Figure 15 plots τ as a function of M for
parameter r = 0.05 and γ = 0.1. Not surprisingly, the higher the balance the shorter the
earliest default time is. Note that the earliest default time goes to infinity near zero balance.
This is because the balance grows very slowly when it is low.
Now, let’s consider the optimal interest rate on the credit line r˜C as a function of the
earliest default time τ . Equation (68) can be rewritten as follows:
r˜C (M (τ)) = r +
2rγ
r + (2γ + r) e2γτ
. (70)
Equation (70) clearly shows that the interest on the credit line is greater than the risk-
free interest rate and decreases with the earliest default time τ . Since the balance M (τ)
is a decreasing function of τ , the interest rate r˜C (M (τ)) increases with the balance. As
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Figure 16: Optimal interest structure in continuous time.
τ → ∞, M (τ) → 0, r˜C (M (τ)) → r. On the other hand, for τ = 0, M (0) = CL, and
r˜C
¡
CL
¢
= r + rγγ+r . Hence, for all τ ≥ 0
r ≤ r˜C (M (τ)) ≤ r + rγ
γ + r
.
The upper bound r + rγγ+r increases with the intensity γ. However, for any γ and τ ,
r ≤ r˜C (M (τ)) ≤ 2r.
Thus, our model predicts that performance pricing in the optimal contract does not lead to
big changes in the interest rate.
While for small τ , the interest rate r˜C increases with γ, we observe an opposite eﬀect
when τ is suﬃciently large. Because of e2γτ in the denominator in equation (70), the interest
rate decreases with γ for large τ . Thus, a higher degree of correlation of the cash flows leads
to higher interest rate at the beginning of the credit line and low interest rate at the end of
the credit line. Figure 16 depicts the optimal interest rate r˜C as a function of MCL for diﬀerent
values of the intensity γ.
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7 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of security design in a setting with an agency problem. An
agent seeks external financing for a project that, if initiated, generates Markov cash flows
whose realizations are unobservable and unverifiable by an outside investor. The agent has
an ability to secretly divert the cash flows for his own consumption. The investor who cannot
detect stealing has the right to liquidate the project. We characterize an optimal contract
between the investor and the agent in this setting. We show that the optimal contract can
be implemented using a credit line with an interest rate that increases with the outstanding
balance on the credit line. The balance on the credit line can be considered as a performance
measure that reflects all the relevant information regarding the past cash flow realizations.
In practice, a line of credit with performance pricing is the most prevalent form of banking
lending. Our model demonstrates that a credit line with performance pricing is a part of the
optimal contract in the setting with the agency problem. This finding is in line with the
recent empirical studies by Asquith, Beatty and Weber (2002), Bradley and Roberts (2004),
Dichev and Skinner (2004), which suggest that performance pricing, along with other debt
covenants, is used to mitigate agency costs.
On the technical side, we develop a new recursive method to deal with correlated hidden
states in dynamic settings. Unlike in the case with independent cash flows, the agent’s
preferences regarding continuation contracts are no longer the common knowledge in the
setting with the correlated cash flows. A major challenge in reformulating the contracting
problem recursively in this situation is to write incentive compatibility constraints. After
reporting the low cash flow when the high cash flow is realized, the agent faces the same
continuation contract that he would get after the low cash flow realized. However, the
agent’s continuation payoﬀs after the deviation is diﬀerent from his continuation payoﬀ after
the low cash flow realization, due to the fact that the distribution of the future cash flows
is determined by the current cash flow. A key element of our analysis is that we are able to
find a one-to-one mapping between the agent’s continuation payoﬀs in the states with the low
and high cash flows. This allows us to formulate the contracting problem recursively using
the agent’s continuation payoﬀ as a state variable and obtain a closed-form solution for the
optimal contract. We also believe that this approach is not only applicable to our setting,
but can also be used in other dynamic principal-agent models with correlated hidden states.
8 Appendix
8.1 Properties of the Markov Cash Flows
Lemma 5 Given Q (yH) ≥ Q (yL), conditional expectations of future cash flows satisfy the
following inequalities. For any k, s > 0,
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(i) E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ] ≥ E [Yt+k|Yt = yL]
(iia) E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ] ≥ E [Yt+k+s|Yt = yH ]
(iib) E [Yt+k|Yt = yL] ≤ E [Yt+k+s|Yt = yL]
(iii)
E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ]
E [Yt+k+1|Yt = yH ] ≥
E [Yt+k+s|Yt = yH ]
E [Yt+k+s+1|Yt = yH ]
(iv) lim
k→∞
E [(Yt+k − yL)|Yt = yH ] = Q (yL)
1− (Q (yH)−Q (yL))
(yH − yL)
Proof. (Lemma 5)
(i) Inequality (i) is proven by induction. For k = 1, the inequality is true because
E [Yt+1|Yt] = yL +Q (Yt) (yH − yL) and Q (yH) ≥ Q (yL). Suppose that E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ] ≥
E [Yt+k|Yt = yL], which implies that E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1 = yH ] ≥ E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1 = yL]. Now,
consider E [Yt+k+1|Yt]. By the law of iterated expectations
E [Yt+k+1|Yt] = E [E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1]|Yt]
= Q(Yt)E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1 = yH ] + (1−Q (Yt))E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1 = yL]
= E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1 = yL] +Q(Yt)(E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1 = yH ]−E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1 = yL])
Since Q (yH) ≥ Q (yL), it follows that E [Yt+k+1|Yt = yH ] ≥ E [Yt+k+1|Yt = yL].
(ii) To show that (iia) holds, we use the law of iterated expectations again.
E [Yt+k+1|Yt = yH ] = E [E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1]|Yt = yH ]
= Q(yH)E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1 = yH ] + (1−Q (yH))E[Yt+k+1|Yt+1 = yL]
= Q(yH)E[Yt+k|Yt = yH ] + (1−Q (yH))E[Yt+k|Yt = yL]
= E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ]− (1−Q (yH)) (E[Yt+k|Yt = yH ]−E[Yt|Yt = yL]).
Using (i), we see that E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ] ≥ E [Yt+k+1|Yt = yH ]. Repeating this argument yields
(iia) for any s. Part (iib) is proven the same way.
(iii) By the law of iterated expectations,
E [Yt+k+s+1|Yt = yH ]E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ]−E [Yt+k+s|Yt = yH ]E [Yt+k+1|Yt = yH ]
= (Q (yH)E [Yt+k+s|Yt = yH ] + (1−Q (yH))E [Yt+k+s|Yt = yL])E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ]
−E [Yt+k+s|Yt = yH ] (Q (yH)E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ] + (1−Q (yH))E [Yt+k|Yt = yL])
= (1−Q (yH)) (E [Yt+k+s|Yt = yL]E [Yt+k|Yt = yH ]−E [Yt+k+s|Yt = yH ]E [Yt+k|Yt = yL])
≥ 0
The last inequality follows from (iia) and (iib).
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(iv) The cash flow process has a unique stationary distribution. One can verify that
lim
k→∞
P (Yt+k = yH |Yt = yH) = Q (yL)
1− (Q (yH)−Q (yL))
.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Let
©
y˜k
¡
yk|yt−1, yˆt−1¢ªTk=t denote a continuation reporting strategy after a history yt−1 of
the realized cash flows, and a history yˆt−1 of the reported cash flows. We the contract σ
is incentive compatible after
¡
yt−1, yˆt−1
¢
, provided the project is active at the beginning of
period t, if for all
©
y˜k
¡
yk|yt−1, yˆt−1¢ªTk=t,
E
"
TX
k=t
βk−t
Pk
¡
yˆt−1, Yt, yk−t
¢
Pt (yˆt−1, Yt)
dt
³
yˆt−1, Yt, yk−t
´
|Yt
#
≥ E
"
TX
k=t
βk−t
Pk
¡
yˆt−1, y˜k
¡
yk|yt−1, yˆt−1¢¢
Pt (yˆt−1, Yt)
Ã
λ(Yk − y˜k
¡
yk|yt−1, yˆt−1¢)
+dt
¡
yˆt−1, y˜k
¡
yk|yt−1, yˆt−1¢¢
!
|Yt
#
.
First, we consider the case in which the agent has been telling the truth until time t. If the
contract is not incentive compatible after
¡
yt−1, yt−1
¢
, then there is a continuation reporting
strategy
©
y˜k
¡
yk|yt−1, yt−1¢ªTk=t that results in a higher continuation payoﬀ than the truth-
telling. However, the existence of
©
y˜k
¡
yk|yt−1, yt−1¢ªTk=t violates the time zero incentive
compatibility constraint. A reporting strategy that consists of truth-telling until time t, truth
telling after all histories other than yt−1 after time t, and
©
y˜k
¡
yk|yt−1, yt−1¢ªTk=t after yt−1
is an improvement on the truth-telling. This contradicts the assumption that the contract is
incentive compatible.
Suppose the contract is not incentive compatible after
¡
yt−1, yˆt−1
¢
, i.e. there exists a con-
tinuation reporting strategy
©
y¯k
¡
yk|yt−1, yˆt−1¢ªTk=t that delivers higher continuation payoﬀ
for the agent than truth-telling. The terms of the contracts after date t− 1 are determined
by the history yˆt−1 of reported cash flows, while the distribution of the future cash flows
depends on the realization of the cash flow in period t. Continuation strategy y¯ must bring
an improvement on truth-telling either after yt = yL, or yt = yH , or in the both cases. Let’s
assume that the agent’s continuation payoﬀ is increased after yt = yL. To show that this
violates the time zero incentive compatibility constraint, we consider the following deviation
from the truth-telling strategy. Let strategy y0 consist of truth-telling until time t and after
all histories of cash flows other than
¡
yˆt−1, yL
¢
, and follows y¯ after
¡
yˆt−1, yL
¢
. Thus, the
only diﬀerence between the truth-telling strategy and y0 occurs after the cash flow history¡
yˆt−1, yL
¢
is realized. Since
¡
yˆt−1, yL
¢
occurs with positive probability and y¯ does better
than the truth-telling after
¡
yˆt−1, yL
¢
, strategy y0 results in an improvement on truth-telling,
violating the time zero incentive compatibility constraint. The same argument applies if the
agent’s continuation payoﬀ is increased after yt = yH .
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8.3 Proof of Theorem 1
We first argue that if for some t and (yt−1, yH), (5) is violated, then the contract is not
incentive compatible. Indeed, the strategy in which the agent lies only at date t, given
(yt−1, yH), will be an improvement on truth-telling, contradicting to the fact that (4) is
satisfied.
Now, suppose that the contract σ = (d, p) is such that (5) is always satisfied. To show
that σ is incentive compatible, consider an arbitrary reporting strategy y˜. Let k ≤ T be
the last period when y˜ can recommend lying. Let yˆ be a reporting strategy that coincides
with y˜ before time k and is truth-telling onward. Since both strategies y˜ and yˆ result in
the same income flows for the agent, as well as the same termination probabilities, before
date k, and inequality (5) is satisfied at date k, then the date zero agent’s expected payoﬀ
under the strategy yˆ is equal to or greater than the corresponding payoﬀ under the strategy
y˜. Applying this argument inductively, we conclude y˜ cannot improve on truth-telling if (5)
is satisfied. This proves that the contract is incentive compatible as long as (5) is satisfied
for all time periods t ≤ T , and all histories yt.
8.4 Proof of Lemma 2
We use the definition of Vτ (Yt−1) and the law of iterated expectations to prove the lemma.
Vτ+1(Yt−1) = E
"
nτ+1X
k=1
βk(Yt−1+k − yL) + lτβ(nτ+2)(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt−1
#
= E
"
β
Ã
(Yt − yL) +
nτX
k=1
βk(Yt+k − yL) + lτβ(nτ+1)(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)
!
|Yt−1
#
= E
"
β
Ã
(Yt − yL) +E
"
nτX
k=1
βk(Yt+k − yL) + lτβ(nτ+1)(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt
#!
|Yt−1
#
= E [β ((Yt − yL) + Vτ (Yt)) |Yt−1]
8.5 Proof of Propositions 2-5.
We prove Propositions 2-5 by induction. Assuming that certain properties of the contract σ∗
hold in periods t+ 1 through T , we verify that those properties must hold in the period t.
8.5.1 Proof of Proposition 2.
Let θt (yt) denote the slope of the line connecting the points of liquidation payoﬀs (0, Lt (yt))
and
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¡
aL (yt) , bet
¡
yt, aL (yt)
¢¢
. By the definition,
θt (yt) =
bet
¡
yt, aL (yt)
¢
− Lt (yt)
aL (yt)
. (71)
To prove Proposition 2 we need the following Lemma.
Lemma 6 The slope θt (yt) does not depend on yt ∈ {yL, yH} and is given by
θt (yt) =
1
λ (yH − yL)
h
(1− α) (yH − yL) +
³
bdt+1 (yH , λ (yH − yL))− Lt+1 (yH)
´i
(72)
Proof. (Lemma 6) If aet = a
L (yt), then according to (31)-(33) the agent’s continuation
payoﬀ in the next period after the cash flow realization will be adt+1 (yt+1) = λ(yt+1 − yL).
Using the fact that bdt+1 (yL, 0) = Lt+1 (yL), we can express the investor’s continuation payoﬀ
bdt
¡
yt, aL (yt)
¢
as follows:
bdt
¡
yt, a
L (yt)
¢
= β
h
Q (yt)
³
yH + b
d
t+1 (yH , λ (yH − yL))
´
+ (1−Q (yt)) (yL + Lt+1 (yL))
i
.
(73)
Recall that
aL (yt) = βQ (yt)λ (yH − yL) , (74)
and
Lt (yt) =
TX
k=t+1
βk−tyL + αVT−t(yt).
Using the Law of iterated expectations we can represent Lt (yt) as follows:
Lt (yt) = β [Q (yt) (yL + α (yH − yL) + Lt+1 (yH)) + (1−Q (yt)) (yL + Lt+1 (yL))] . (75)
Substituting (73), (74) and (75) into (71) we obtain formula (72).
Proof. (Proposition 2) The investor chooses the termination policy to maximize his con-
tinuation payoﬀ, given the agent’s continuation payoﬀ. Since the agent and the investor get
payoﬀs 0 and Lt (yt) in the case of termination, and the project can be terminated proba-
bilistically, all payoﬀs are feasible within the convex hull of (0, Lt (yt)) and the end-of-period
payoﬀ possibility set, whose upper frontier is given by bet . Let
¡
a˜Lt (yt) , b
e
t
¡
yt, a˜Lt (yt)
¢¢
be the
point, where the line originating from (0, Lt (yt)) is tangent to bet . This line represents the
highest possible continuation payoﬀ for the investor before the liquidation decision has been
made in period t, given the agent’s continuation payoﬀ belongs to the interval
¡
0, a˜Lt (yt)
¢
.
To prove the proposition we need to show that a˜Lt (yt) = λV1 (yt). To do this we will show
that the slope of the line connecting the liquidation payoﬀ point (0, Lt (yt)) with the point
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(λV1 (yt) , bet (yt, λV1 (yt))) is greater than the right-hand-side derivative of b
e
t at λV1 (yt).
The slope of the line is given by (72). Consider the right-hand-side derivative of bet , taken at
aLt (yt) ≡ λV1 (yt). Using (31)-(33), we can write that for aet = λVτ (yt) with τ ≥ 1
bdt (yt, a
e
t ) = β (1−Q (yt)) (yL + bdt+1
³
yL, a
d
t+1 (yL)
´
) (76)
+βQ (yt)
³
yH + b
d
t+1
³
yH , a
d
t+1 (yH)
´´
,
where
adt+1 (yt+1) = λVτ−1 (yt) + λ (yt − yL) . (77)
Diﬀerentiating (76) with respect to aet gives
∂bdt (yt, a
e
t )
∂aet
= νt
³
yt, a
d
t+1 (yL)
´ ∂bdt+1 ¡yL, adt+1 (yL)¢
∂adt+1 (yL)
(78)
+νt
³
yt, adt+1 (yH)
´ ∂bdt+1 ¡yH , adt+1 (yH)¢
∂adt+1 (yH)
,
where νt
¡
yt, adt+1 (yH)
¢
= βQ (yt)
∂adt+1(yH)
∂aet
and νt
¡
yt, adt+1 (yL)
¢
= β (1−Q (yt))
∂adt+1(yL)
∂aet
.
Using (13), one can verify that
νt
³
yt, a
d
t+1 (yL)
´
= (1−Q (yt))
E [(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt+1 = yL]
E [(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt = yt]
, (79)
and that
νt
³
yt, a
d
t+1 (yH)
´
= Q (yt)
E [(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt+1 = yH ]
E [(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt = yt]
= 1− νt
³
yt, a
d
t+1 (yL)
´
. (80)
Thus, the right-hand-side derivative of bet at the point λV1 (yt) can be written as
∂bdt (yt, λV1 (yt)+)
∂adt
=
∂bdt+1 (yL, 0+)
∂adt+1 (yL)
ν (yt, 0+) +
∂bdt+1 (yH , λ (yH − yL)+)
∂adt+1 (yH)
(1− ν (yt, 0+)) ,
(81)
where
ν (yt, 0+) = (1−Q (yt))
E [Yt+2|Yt+1 = yL]
E [Yt+2|Yt = yt] ,
and ”+” indicates the fact that we are considering the right neighborhood of a given point.
58
Subtracting (81) from (72) and rearranging terms gives
θ (yt)−
∂bdt (yt, λV1 (yt)+)
∂adt
=
"
(1− α)
λ
−
∂bdt+1 (yL, 0+)
∂adt+1 (yL)
ν (yt, 0+)
#
+
"
bdt+1 (yH , λ (yH − yL))
λ (yH − yL)
−
∂bdt+1 (yH , λ (yH − yL)+)
∂adt+1 (yH)
(1− ν (yt, 0+))−
Lt+1 (yH)
λ (yH − yL)
#
≥
"
(1− α)
λ
−
∂bdt+1 (yL, 0+)
∂adt+1 (yL)
ν (yt, 0+)
#
+
"
bdt+1 (yH , λ (yH − yL) ν (yt, 0+))
λ (yH − yL)
− Lt+1 (yH)
λ (yH − yL)
#
. (82)
The inequality follows from concavity of the function bdt+1.
By the assumption of our inductive argument, Proposition 2 and Lemma 6 hold in period
t + 1. Therefore, bdt+1 is aﬃne on the interval [0, λV1 (yt)], with b
d
t+1 (yt+1, 0) = Lt+1 (yt+1),
and its derivative on this interval is equal to the slope θt+1 (yt+1), which does not depend on
yt+1. Hence,
∂bdt+1 (yL, 0+)
∂adt+1
ν (yt, 0+) = θt+1 (yL) ν (yt, 0+)
= θt+1 (yH) ν (yt, 0+)
=
∂bdt+1 (yH , 0+)
∂adt+1
ν (yt, 0+) (83)
On the other hand,
bdt+1 (yH , λ (yH − yL) ν (yt, 0+))
λ (yH − yL)
− Lt+1 (yH)
λ (yH − yL)
=
∂bdt+1 (yH , 0+)
∂adt+1
ν (yt, 0+) (84)
Substituting (83) and (84) into (82) gives
θ (yt)−
∂bdt (yt, λV1 (yt)+)
∂adt
≥ .(1− α)
λ
≥ 0
This proves that the tangent point is equal to aLt (yt) = λV1 (yt), which gives us the desired
result.
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8.5.2 Proof of Proposition 3
For y ∈ {yL, yH}, let ∂b
d
t (y,adt )
∂adt
denote the right-hand-side derivative of the continuation
function bdt . The proof of Proposition 3 follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 7 The continuation functions bdt
¡
Yt, adt
¢
are concave in the agent’s continuation
payoﬀ adt . Moreover,
∂bdt (yL, Vτ (yL))
∂adt
≥ ∂b
d
t (yH , Vτ (yH))
∂adt
(85)
Proof. (Lemma 7). Since bdT
¡
yT , adT
¢
= −adT , the statement of the lemma is true in the
final period. We assume that the statement of the Lemma is true in period t + 1. If τ ≤ 1,
then ∂b
d
t (yL,Vτ (yL))
∂adt
=
∂bdt (yH ,Vτ (yH))
∂adt
, according to Lemma 6.
Let τ > 1. Using (78)-(80), we can represent a derivative the continuation function in
period t as the weighted average of derivatives of the continuation function in period t+ 1:
∂bdt (yt, Vτ (yt))
∂adt
= ν (yt, τ)
∂bdt+1 (yL, λVτ−1 (yL))
∂adt+1 (yL)
+ (1− ν (yt, τ))
∂bdt+1 (yH , λVτ−1 (yH) + λ (yH − yL))
∂adt+1 (yH)
,
where
νt (yt, τ) = (1−Q (yt))
E [(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt+1 = yL]
E [(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt = yt]
.
Since by the assumption of induction, the statement of the lemma is true in period t+ 1,
∂bdt+1 (yL, λVτ−1 (yL))
∂adt+1 (yL)
≥
∂bdt+1 (yH , λVτ−1 (yH))
∂adt+1 (yH)
≥
∂bdt+1 (yH , λVτ−1 (yH) + λ (yH − yL))
∂adt+1 (yH)
,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that bdt+1
¡
yH , adt
¢
is concave in adt .
Thus, to prove (85) it is enough to show that νt (yL, τ) > νt (yH , τ). However, since
E [(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt = yL] < E [(Yt+nτ+1 − yL)|Yt = yH ], it immediately follows that
νt (yL, τ) > νt (yH , τ) ,
which proves that the inequality (85) holds in period t.
Now it is easy to prove Proposition 3.
Proof. (Proposition 3). Consider Problem (22)-(25), in which the objective function is
maximized by the pair of continuation payoﬀs adt (yL) and a
d
t (yH) subject to the (IC), (PK),
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and (IR) constraints. Let the diﬀerence between them be denoted by ξ ≡ adt (yH)− adt (yL).
We will show that the objective function decreases in the diﬀerence ξ. Since the continuation
payoﬀs satisfy the promise keeping constraint (PK) it must be the case that
adt (yL, ξ) = a
y
t −Q (yt−1) ξ
adt (yH , ξ) = a
y
t + (1−Q (yt−1))ξ.
The investor’s continuation payoﬀ as a function of ξ is given by
b˜ (ξ) = (1−Q (yt−1)) (yL + bdt
³
yL, a
d
t (yL, ξ)
´
+Q (yt−1) (yH + b
d
t
³
yH , a
d
t (yH , ξ)
´
). (86)
Taking the derivative of b˜ with respect to ξ, we obtain that
b˜0 (ξ) = −Q (yt−1) (1−Q (yt−1))
Ã
∂bdt
¡
yL, adt (yL, ξ)
¢
∂adt
−
∂bdt
¡
yH , adt (yH , ξ)
¢
∂adt
!
≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 7.
Since b˜0 (ξ) ≤ 0, the solution of Problem (22)-(25) is obtained by choosing the smallest
ξ such that the (IC) constraint is satisfied, which corresponds to the case in which the (IC)
constraint is satisfied with equality.
8.5.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose the continuation contract σ∗t (yL) results in the continuation payoﬀ a
d
t (yL) for the
agent after the low cash flow realization in period t. Lemma 1 says that since the contract σ∗
is incentive compatible, it is always optimal for the agent to report cash flows truthfully in
the future, even if the agent deviated in the past. Given the probability of liquidation pt in
period t, we can represent this payoﬀ as the expectation of the agent’s continuation payoﬀs
in the next period:
adt (yL) = E
h
β (1− pt) adt+1 (Yt+1) |Yt = yL
i
, (87)
where adt+1 (Yt+1) denotes the continuation payoﬀ for the agent in period t + 1 under the
continuation contract σ∗t (yL) conditional on the cash flow Yt+1.
Similarly, if the agent reports the low cash flow in period t, when, in fact, the high
cash flow realized, the same contract results in the following continuation payoﬀ after the
deviation:
ct
³
adt (yL)
´
= E
h
β (1− pt) adt+1 (Yt+1) |Yt = yH
i
. (88)
In the equations (88), the expectation is taken over the same continuation payoﬀs adt+1 (Yt+1),
but with respect to a diﬀerent cash flow realization in period t.
We consider the cases with adt (yL) < a
L (yL) and adt (yL) > a
L (yL).
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Case 1: adt (yL) > a
L (yL). Let
adt (yL) = λVτ (yL) ,
for some τ ≥ 1. According to Proposition 2 and equations (31)-(34), the probability of
liquidation pt is zero, and the continuation payoﬀs in the next period are given by
adt+1 (Yt+1) = λVτ−1 (Yt+1) + λ(Yt+1 − yL). (89)
Substituting this into (88) gives
ct
³
adt (yL)
´
= E [β(λVτ−1 (Yt+1) + λ(Yt+1 − yL))|Yt = yH ]
= λVτ (yH) ,
where the second equality follows from Lemma 2. Thus,
ct (λVτ (yL)) = λVτ (yH) .
Case 2: adt (yL) ≤ aL (yL). Again, let
adt (yL) = λVτ (yL) ,
for some τ < 1. Since τ < 1, Vτ (y) = τE [β (Yt+1 − yL) |Yt = y]. Then, the probability of
liquidation is given by pt = 1− τ . If the project is not liquidated in period t, the next period
continuation payoﬀs are given by
adt+1 (Yt+1) = λ(Yt+1 − yL),
in accordance with Proposition 2 and equations (31)-(34). Then, the equation (89) gives
ct
³
adt (yL)
´
= E [βτλ(Yt+1 − yL)|Yt = yH ]
= λVτ (yH) .
Thus, we proved Proposition 4 for Case 2.
8.5.4 Proof of Proposition 5
According to Lemma 2,
1
β
Vτ+1(Yt−1) = E [Vτ (Yt) + (Yt − yL)|Yt−1] .
Hence, the (PK) constraint is satisfied.
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According to (30), adt (yL) = λVτ (yL) and a
d
t (yH) = λVτ (yH) + λ(yH − yL). Proposition
4 says that ct
¡
adt (yL)
¢
= λVτ (yH). Putting all together:
adt (yH) = ct
³
adt (yL)
´
+ λ (yH − yL) .
Thus, adt (yL) and a
d
t (yH) satisfy the (IC) constraint as equality.
Substituting (30) into (22) gives byt
³
Yt−1, 1βλVτ+1 (Yt−1)
´
.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. In order to prove that σ∗ is the optimal contract, we will demonstrate that for each
date t and for any agent’s continuation payoﬀ ayt , there is no continuation contract that
results in the investor’s payoﬀ greater than byt (yt−1, a
y
t ).
Let σ˜ be an arbitrary incentive compatible contract, with the continuation payoﬀs after
the cash flow realization in period t for the agent and the investor given by a˜dt (yt), and
b˜dt
¡
yt, a˜dt (yt)
¢
. The continuation payoﬀ for the investor at the beginning of period t is given
by
b˜yt (Yt−1, a
y
t ) = Et
h
Yt + b˜dt
³
Yt, a˜dt (Yt)
´
|Yt−1
i
.
Let c˜t denote a deviation payoﬀ function, associated with the contract σ˜. Since, by assump-
tion, σ˜ is incentive compatible, the agent’s continuation payoﬀs a˜dt , associated with σ˜, must
satisfy
a˜dt (yH) ≥ c˜t
³
a˜dt (yL)
´
+ λ (yH − yL) for all t ≤ T. (90)
In the last period, b˜dT
¡
YT , a˜dT (YT )
¢
≤ bdT
¡
YT , a˜dT (YT )
¢
. We assume by induction that
b˜dt
¡
Yt, a˜dt (Yt)
¢
≤ bdt
¡
Yt, a˜dt (Yt)
¢
.
In the proof of Proposition 3, we demonstrate that the functionEt
£
Yt + bdt
¡
Yt, a˜dt (Yt)
¢ |Yt−1¤
(see equation (86)) increases as the diﬀerence a˜dt (yH)−a˜dt (yL) decreases. Since b˜dt
¡
Yt, a˜dt (Yt)
¢
≤
bdt
¡
Yt, a˜dt (Yt)
¢
, the only way that b˜yt (Yt−1, a
y
t ) can be greater than b
y
t (Yt−1, a
y
t ) is when
a˜dt (yH) − a˜dt (yL) < adt (yH) − adt (yL), where adt (yH) and adt (yL) the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint under the contract σ∗:
adt (yH) = ct
³
adt (yL)
´
+ λ (yH − yL) .
To illustrate that this is impossible that a˜dt (yH)−a˜dt (yL) < adt (yH)−adt (yL), we will show
that c˜t (a) ≥ ct (a). We will show recursively that equation (90) implies that c˜t (a) ≥ ct (a),
for all a ≥ 0, and t ≤ T . This must be true in the last period T for the contract σ˜ to be
incentive compatible.
Suppose at time t,
c˜t (a) ≥ ct (a) , for all a ≥ 0. (91)
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Equations (90) and (91) imply that if a˜dt (yL) = λVτ (yL), then a˜
d
t (yH) = λVτ (yH) +
λ (yH − yL) + ϕ, with ϕ ≥ 0, and ϕ > 0 if equation (91) holds with strict inequality.
Now, consider continuation payoﬀs in period t−1. Given the continuation payoﬀs a˜dt (yL)
and a˜dt (yH) in period t, we can compute the continuation payoﬀ in period t− 1:
a˜dt−1 (yL) = E
h
βa˜dt (Yt) |Yt−1 = yL
i
= Vτ+1 (yL) +Q (yL)βϕ
= Vτ1 (yL) , (92)
The deviation payoﬀ c˜t−1
¡
a˜dt−1 (yL)
¢
in period t− 1 can be obtained as follows:
c˜t−1
³
a˜dt−1 (yL)
´
= E
h
βa˜dt (Yt) |Yt−1 = yH
i
= Vτ+1 (yH) +Q (yH)βϕ
= Vτ2 (yH) , (93)
for where parameters τ1 and τ2 are chosen so that the corresponding equalities in (93) and
(92) hold.
In particular, τ1 solves
Q (yL)βϕ = (1− lτ )βnτ+1E [(Ynτ+1 − yL) |Y0 = yL]
+
nτ1X
k=τ+2
βkE [(Yk − yL) |Y0 = yL] + lτ1βnτ1+1E
£¡
Ynτ1+1 − yL
¢ |Y0 = yL¤ ,
where nτ is the biggest integer, such that nτ ≤ τ , and lτ = τ − nτ . Similarly, τ2 solves
Q (yH)βϕ = (1− lτ )βnτ+1E [(Ynτ+1 − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
+
nτ2X
k=τ+2
βkE [(Yk − yL) |Y0 = yH ] + lτ2βnτ2+1E
£¡
Ynτ2+1 − yL
¢ |Y0 = yH¤ ,
Using the fact that E [(Y1 − yL) |Y0 = y] = Q (y) (yH − yL) and Lemma 5 (iia) and (iib),
E [(Yk − yL) |Y0 = yL]
Q (yL)βϕ
≥ E [(Yk − yL) |Y0 = yH ]
Q (yH)βϕ
.
Therefore, τ1 ≤ τ2.
Recall that ct (Vτ1 (yL)) = Vτ1 (yH). The fact that τ1 ≤ τ2 gives us the desired result:
c˜t
¡
a˜dt−1 (yL)
¢
≥ ct
¡
a˜dt−1 (yL)
¢
.
The function c˜t determines the diﬀerence between a˜dt (yH) and a˜
d
t (yL). The greater the
value of the function c˜t, the greater this diﬀerence is. Hence, b˜
y
t (Yt−1, a
y
t ) cannot be greater
than byt (Yt−1, a
y
t ). Consequently, σ˜ cannot be better than σ
∗.
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8.7 Proof of Proposition 8
The only parameter aﬀected by the uncertainty about the initial state Y0 is the distribution
of date 1 earning Y1. The probability of Y1 = yH is given by q1 ≡ Q (yH) qH+Q (yL) (1− qH).
Conditional on the realization of Y1, the agent’s and the investor’s continuation payoﬀs are
given by ad1 (Y1) and b
d
1
¡
Y1, ad1 (Y1)
¢
.
Given the agent’s payoﬀ a0, the investor chooses the agent’s continuation payoﬀs ad1 (·) to
solve the following optimization problem:
b0 (a0) ≡ max
ad1(·)
βE
h
Y1 + bd1
³
Y1, ad1 (Y1)
´i
s.t. ad1 (yH) ≥ c1
³
ad1 (yL)
´
+ λ (yH − yL) (IC1)
a0 = βE
h
ad1 (Y1)
i
(PK1)
Our previous analysis of a similar problem indicates that (IC1) binds. Letting ae0 (Y0) ≡
βE
£
ad1 (Y1) |Y0
¤
, and be0 (Y0, a
e
0 (Y0)) ≡ βE
£
Y1 + bd1
¡
Y1, ad1 (Y1)
¢ |Y0 ¤ gives the result.
8.8 Proof of Proposition 9
The proof is by showing that b00 (a0) ≥ −1. Using the fact that a0 = E [ae0 (Y0)], b0 (a0) =
E [be0 (Y0, a
e
0 (Y0))] and a
e
0 (yH) = c0 (a
e
0 (yL)), we can write
b00 (a0) =
dbe0
dae0(yL)
a0
dae0(yL)
=
(1− qH) be00 (yL, ae0 (yL)) + qHbe00 (yH , c00 (ae0 (yL))) c00 (ae0 (yL))
(1− qH) + qHc00 (ae0 (yL))
.
Since be00 (Y0, ae0 (Y0)) ≥ −1, b00 (a0) ≥ −1.
8.9 Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. The proof consists of two steps. First, given the parameters of the securities, we show
that the agent’s strategy of using all the cash flows to pay the debt replicates the agent’s and
the investor’s continuation payoﬀs under the corresponding optimal contract σ∗. Then, we
show that this strategy is incentive compatible.
Step 1. We assume that the agent adopts the ”pay-debt-first” strategy: he uses cash
flows generated by the project to pay the credit line balance until it is paid in full, and only
after that he starts the consumption. Given this strategy, we will show that, in the credit
line settings, for any history of the realizations of cash flows, the payments between the agent
and the investor and the termination probabilities are identical to those under the optimal
contract σ∗.
To see this, let aet (Yt) = Vτ t (Yt) be the agent’s continuation payoﬀs under the optimal
contract, which evolution is determined by the evolution of the earliest default time τ t.
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Consider the following process:
gt ≡ Vτ t (yH) .
One can see that gt = aet (yH), and gt > a
e
t (yL).
Step 1.1. As an intermediate step, we show by induction that Mt = VT−t (yH) − gt.
Given ae0 (Y0) = Vτ0 (Y0), the initial draw on the credit line is given by M0 = VT (yH) − g0,
where g0 = Vτ0 (yH). Assume that Mt−1 = VT−t+1 (yH) − gt−1 = VT−t+1 (yH) − Vτ t−1 (yH).
The interest rate corresponding to the balance Mt−1 is given by
rCt =
VT−t (yH)− Vτ t−1−1 (yH)
VT−t+1 (yH)− Vτ t−1 (yH)
− 1.
The agent pays (Yt− yL) on the credit line in period t. The evolution of the balance is given
by
Mt = max
©
0, min
©¡
1 + rˆCt
¢
Mt−1 − (Yt − yL), CLt
ªª
. (94)
Substituting rˆCt and C
L
t into (94) gives
Mt = max
©
0, min
©
VT−t (yH)− Vτ t−1−1 (yH)− (Yt − yL), VT−t (yH)− aL (yH)
ªª
= max
©
0, (VT−t (yH)−max
©
Vτ t−1−1 (yH) + (Yt − yL), aL (yH))
ªª
= VT−t (yH)−min
©
VT−t (yH) , max
©
Vτ t−1−1 (yH) + (Yt − yL), aL (yH)
ªª
.
According to (34), aet (Yt) = min
©
VT−t (Yt) ,max
©
Vτ t−1−1 (Yt) + (Yt − yL), aL (Yt)
ªª
, be-
cause aet−1 (Yt−1) = Vτ t−1 (Yt−1). By the definition, if Yt = yH , then gt = a
e
t (yH) =
min
©
VT−t (yH) ,max
©
Vτt−1−1 (yH) + yH − yL, V1 (yH)
ªª
. If Yt = yL, then
aet (yL) = min
©
VT−t (yL) ,max
©
Vτ t−1−1 (yL) , V1 (yL)
ªª
and, therefore,
gt = min
©
VT−t (yH) ,max
©
Vτ t−1−1 (yH) , V1 (yH)
ªª
. Thus,
gt = min
©
VT−t (yH) ,max
©
Vτ t−1−1 (yH) + (Yt − yL), V1 (yH)
ªª
, which implies that
Mt = VT−t (yH)− gt. (95)
Step 1.2
From (95), one can see that, given the agent’s strategy, the credit line replicates the opti-
mal mechanism. A zero balance on the credit line corresponds to the continuation payoﬀ of
aet (Yt) = λVT−t (Yt). On the other hand, the liquidation under the credit line implementation
happens with probability max{0, (1− τ)} in period t when gt = Vτ (yH). This implies that
the credit line, combined with the agent’s strategy, leads to the same outcome in terms of
payments between the agent and the investor and the same termination probabilities as those
under the optimal contract.
Step 2.
To finish the proof we show that the agent’s strategy is incentive compatible. Since the
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agent is not allowed to borrow from the credit line for his own consumption, the only possible
deviation for him is to use a fraction of the earning for consumption before the credit line is
paid oﬀ. This deviation is possible only when Yt = yH .
Given Yt = yH , consider a one-period deviation, i.e. the agent sticks to the ”pay-debt-
first” strategy in the subsequent periods. Then, gt = aet (yH), and, hence, Mt = a
FB
t (yH)−
aet (yH). If a
e
t (yH) > a
L (yH), then there is no liquidation. An increase in the credit line
balanceMt is equivalent to a decrease in the continuation payoﬀ aet (yH) by the same amount.
Therefore, it is optimal for the agent to pay the credit line first.
Now, consider termination. Let zt be the unmade payment. The agent consumes zt,
and faces the probability of the termination pt = ztaL(yH) . With the probability (1− pt) the
unmade payment zt is forgiven. In this case, Mt = CLt = VT−t (yH)− V1 (yH), which implies
that agent’s continuation payoﬀ is equal to λV1 (yH). The agent’s continuation payoﬀ in the
middle of period t is, therefore, (1− pt)V1 (yH) = V1 (yH)− zt. One can see that the amount
of the unmade payment is subtracted from the continuation payoﬀ of the agent. Thus, the
agent does not have any incentive to divert the earning, and the ”pay-debt-first” strategy is
incentive compatible.
8.10 Proof of Lemma 4
One can verify that
E [∆Yt+k|Yt = y] = ∆
2
³
1 + (2y − 1) (2q − 1)k
´
.
Let β = e−r∆, µ = 2q − 1. Then, using the formula for the sum of a geometric progression
yields
E
⎡
⎣
τ/∆X
k=1
e−r∆k∆Yt+k|Yt = y
⎤
⎦ ≈ ∆
2
⎛
⎝
β
³
1− βτ/∆
´
1− β + (2y − 1)
βµ
³
1− (βµ)τ/∆
´
1− βµ
⎞
⎠ .
Taking the limit yields
lim
∆→0
∆
2
⎛
⎝
β
³
1− βτ/∆
´
1− β + (2y − 1)
βµ
³
1− (βµ)τ/∆
´
1− βµ
⎞
⎠
= lim
∆→0
e−r∆ (1− e−rτ )
2(1− e−r∆)/∆ + (2y − 1) lim∆→0
e−r∆
¡
2e−γ∆ − 1
¢ ³
1− e−rτ
¡
2e−γ∆ − 1
¢τ/∆´
2(1− e−r∆ (2e−γ∆ − 1))/∆
=
1− e−rτ
2r
+ (2y − 1) 1− e
−(2γ+r)τ
2 (2γ + r)
.
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